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GENERAL ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 1903-1908 
CHAPTER] 
PREVIOUS ANTAGONISMS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND RUSSIA 
--
Great Britain has proved herself sufficient to 
counteract Russia in her Balkan enterprises on more 
than one occasion. In mentioning the War for Greek 
Independence, we must remember that political aspir-
ations of the Tsars and a series of wars had made 
the Russians and the Turks traditional enemies and 
that Great Britain entered the war in order that 
Russia might not unduly profit at the expense of the 
Turks. In 1841, Great Britain was in a great way 
responsible for the Treaty of the Straits which 
closed the Dardanelles in time of war. In 1853, 
Turkey and Russia again went to war, and the follow-
ing year Great Britain and France formally joined 
Turkey, Sardinia joining the Allies in 1855. They 
met with rather unexpected resistance, and it was 
not until 1856 that Russia was forced to submit. 
At the meeting of the Congress of Berlin in 1878, 
the Tsar, quite naturally, was afraid that a congress 
of such jealous diplomats would re-examine and re-
construct the very satisfactory treaty of San Stefano, 
i 
J 




so as to rob h~ of the spoils of conquest. Lord 
Beaconsfield, by threatening Russia with war, succeed-
ed in persuading the reluctant Tsar to submit the en-
tire question to the conference, and he had the good 
tor tune to turn the tables to the interests of Great 
Britain and Austria-Hungary. 
Atter the negotiations ot 1878, Great Britain 
began to realize that the expansion of Russia in the 
Balkans was not a weighty hindranoe to Great Britain 
and her interests there, which were being etfaced by 
rising conflicts between Austria and Russia in the 
struggle of torces of Pan-Slavism against Pan-German-
1 
ism. The chief argument of the Conservatives under 
Disraeli had been that Constantinople was the impor-
tant bulwark ot the Suez Canal and the protector of 
the routes into Asia Minor, Egypt and the Indian 
Empire. These fears had been greatly exaggerated 
throughout the Conservative regime, tor Russia was too 
weak internally for such an enterprise, and such 
aggressive plans would have frightened even Russia 
2 
herself. In 1880, Disraeli, with his ideals and 
1 
Charles Seymour. The Diplomatic Background ot 
the War 1870-1914, p. 19r.- -
-,-
S. A. Korff. Russia's Foreign Relations During 





pollcles, was annlhilated and the LlberalB headed by 
Gladstone came into power. Gladstone never feared 
Russia as Dlsraeli had, and his antlpathies were ad-
verse to those of hls Conservative opponent. He 
hated Turkey and praised Russia for her defense of 
Pan-Slavism. After the Congress of 1878, England 
was working to weaken the Turkish Empire without un-
necessarily increasing the Russian influence there. 
It was in Bulgaria that England, with the assis-
tance of Austria, challenged Russian aspirations. The 
Bulgars were obsessed by a keen spirit of nationalis-
tic patriotism and their proud and independent atti-
tude caused Russia to adopt a decidedly unfriendly 
attitude. Prince Alexander, by refusing to be the 
tool of the Tsar, found himself opposed and check-
mated by Russia in public and private affairs, and 
finally in 1886, he was forced to abdicate the throne. 
Russia showed much open hostility toward the Bulgarian 
peoples, but the latter were successful in holding 
their own by grasping the support they received from 
Austrla and England. This did not help to create a 
friendlier feeling between the great Slav power and 
Great Britain. Ger.many welcomed this growing amity 
of her ally and England with enthusiasm, mainly to 





that German prestige was ruined with the former 
1 
country. 
The interests of all the great Powers in the 
Eastern question was recognized by Central Europe. 
4 
Certain of the European states desired that the 
Ottoman power not be entirely destroyed but weakened 
instead, While others desired that it be reaffirmed. 
To each and every power it has been a matter of vital 
importance that the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles not 
be held by one strong power. The Russians had to con-
sider that Great Britain would never consent to their 
control and occupation of Constantinople in addition 
to Russia having the Persian capitol, Tehera, within 
her sphere of influence. It seems they had no doubt 
2 
as to this, though to secure Byzantium for herself 
had been the dream of Russia since the days of Peter 
the Great and Catherine II. 
The Russians have displayed much sentiment in 
claiming Constantinople as the source from Which 
Russian civilization !as derived; and when one 
studies Russia1s position geographically and econo-
mically, one teels she was justified in all her 
1 
Korff. OPe cit. P. 32. 
~. Siebert - G. A. Schreiner. Introduction to 




endeavors to gain control within the confines of her 
southern neighbor. Strategically, the control of the 
Dardanelles would give her absolute mastery of the 
northeastern part of the Mediterranean, and the Black 
Sea would thus be transformed into a Russian lake, 
fram which her battleships might emerge freely and 
tully equipped for battle, and to which they might re-
treat in time of dire distress. Economically, the 
Russian control of the Straits would give a self-pro-
tected outlet for her food and grain-stuffs whiCh she 
exports fram Odessa. Russia has became the "granary 
of Europe," and if the Straits were to be closed to 
her, it would mean an economic paralysis to a most 
1 
important part of the Russian Empire. 
Another important factor has to be considered 
if we are to believe that Russia was extremely de-
sirous of winning Constantinople. Although Mother 
Nature has been extraordinarily good to her in many 
respects, she has laid a heavy handicap upon her in 
another. Russia has no ice-free port on an open sea 
which can be utilized the whole year round. This 
mighty Empire needed and was ever seeking an outlet 
to a sea that did not freeze. By far the largest 
part of the world's commerce is sea-borne; the 
1 













oceans are the great highways of commerce. With a 
TerJ few exceptions, every nation, no matter how 
great or how small, has its own individual ports on 
6 
thi s great thoroughfare. But Russia, wi th the most 
extensive territory and an enormous population, had 
no outlet under her own control; not one where she 
could keep a fleet that would not be frozen up in the 
2 
winter. Russia has been thwarted in all her efforts 
to reach the ocean waterways for she has always found 
herself blocked. It was in vain that Peter the Great 
moved his capitol tram Moscow to the Baltic, for the 
latter has been closed by the rise of Germany. She 
was barred by England under Disraeli in the Near 
East fram access to the Mediterranean. The British 
Alliance with Japan had deprived Russia of the outlet 
of Port Arthur in the Far East and her only hope of 
ever gaining access to the PaCific, except on an ice-
bound coast has been cut off by Japan. Her ambitions 
in the Persian Gulf were sacrificed to Great Britain 
by the ~reaty of 1907. For all these failures, Russia 
felt that ODe success would atone; the winning of 
3 
control over the Dardanelles. 
1 















As Count Kapnist remarked in May, 1897: "Russia 
needs this gatekeeper (portier) in TUrkish clothes 
for the Dardanelles, which under no circumstances 
ought to be opened. The Black Sea ia a Rus sian mare 
1 
clausum. It 
Thus we see that for Russia, the extenaion ot 
her influence in the Bear East has, in recent years, 
become more important. On the other hand, Great 
Britain has g1 ven up her fear of Russia in the last 
twenty-five years with a most kindly complaisance. 
Before she had purchased the controlling interests 
in the Suez Canal, Great Britain felt that Russian 
control of the Balkans and the Straits would hinder 
her route to India. When she establi&hed a practical 
protectorate over Egypt a few years later, she began 
to think her path was sate. Egypt is "the key to the 
East," and just as long as British influence was 
assured there, Russian power in the Near East might 
2 
be regarded with little indifference. As the cen-
tUI7 came to a close, Germany began to come into the 
lime-light as a more dangerous rival than RuSSia, and 
the great statesmen of England believed that the ad-
vance of the Great Central Power in the Near East 
1 
Die Grosse Politik der Europlischen Kabinette, 
1871-l9Ii. vol. XII, p. !US. 
a 








could best be met by encouraging, and at least not 
discouraging. the claims o~ Russia. 
When Russia ~ound herself blocked in the Near 
East, she turned to the Central East ~or a possible 
outlet to the sea. '!'his movement was regarded with 
consternation by British India, ~ar they thought 
surely that the enterprising Tsar would turn in 
descent upon India and gain absolute control o~ the 
Persian Gulf. It was in the l860's that the armies 
8 
of Russia took possession o~ Bokhara and established 
themselves upon the borders of Afghanistan. Russian 
threats became more pointed during the next ten years. 
The Russian arm:;r was marching towards the ~rontier, 
and two plans had been drawn up by General Skobelet 
for the invasion of India. Russia was distracted by 
much local trouble and her determination wavered • 
The ~ollowing year, a British expedition under Roberts 
entered Afghanistan and restored much ot the tormer 
British influence. Although Russia declared she would 
not interfere with British interests and her special 
position in Afghanistan, the leading statesmen still 
felt that the presence of Russian merchants there was 
an indication that the danger was not over yet. Until 
the early part o~ the twentieth century, the Russian 
plots and intrigues in this district were still main-







In 1905, Mr. Balfour, in his speech of May 11 on 
Imperial Defence, identified the "problem of the 
British Army" with the defence of Afghanistan. 
Russia, he declared, was making steady progress 
toward Afghanistan, and railways were under con-
struction which could only be strategic. War was 
improbable, but these factors altered the position. 
India could not be taken by surprise and assault. 
9 
A war on the North-West Frontier would be Chiefly a 
problem of transport and supply. England must there-
fore allow nothing to be done to facilitate transport. 
Any attempt to make a railway in Afghanistan in con-
nection with the Russian strategic railways should be 
regarded as an act of direct aggreston against Eng-
land. Mr. Balfour continues: "I have, however, not 
the smallest grounds to believe that Russia intends to 
build such a railway. If ever attempted, it would be 
the heaviest conceivable blow at our Indian Empire. 
As long as we say resolutely that railways in Afghan-
istan should only be made in time of war, we can make 
India absolutely secure. But if we, through blindness 
or cowardice, permit the slow absorption of the coun-
try, if the strategic railways are allowed to creep 
close to our frontier, we shall have to maintain a 
1 
much larger army." 











It was Persia that was the real danger point 
between the two nations. The Persian Government was 
very inefficient, their finances were in a deplorable 
condition, and internal disorders pervaded. For 
these reasons Persia was not only open to foreign in-
terference, but she positively invited and attracted 
it. Here Russia carried on a successful financial 
and commercial development which did not tend to take 
away a~ of the British fears or jealousy of the in-
fluence which Russia exercised in the Central East. 
Teheran, in the northern part of persia, was the cap-
itol and the seat of the Central Government; it was 
within easy striking distance from RuSSia, while it 
was quite out of British reaCh. Through the skill 
ot Russian financiers, the Russian Loan Bank became 
the sole creditor of PerSia, which placed Russia on 
1 
quite a sound foundation for political advantages. 
Russian advances toward the border of India were very 
sensitive and dangerous points to the British. It 
seems that Russia's design was not decided because 
of the power of her awn momentum and by the internal 
2 
weakness of Persia. The consistent policy of Russia 
1 
G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley. British Docu-
ments On the Origins ot the War 1898-1915. Vol. IV, 
No. 321 (a), p. 367. 
2 








in Persia has been gradually and imperceptibly to es-
tablish a "veiled protectorate" by subjugating it 
commercially and financially; isolating it as far as 
possible from all contact with foreign influences; 
appropriating its revenues as the security for politi-
cal loans; preventing it from progressing or develop-
ing its resources. except through Russian agencies; 
and then. having reduced the Shah to a state of com-
plete vassalage and impotence, to rule through him 
and in his name, by means of authoritative Russian 
adv:tsers. from the Caspian Sea to the Gulf and from 
1 
the Turkish to the Indian frontiers. The British 
poliey in Persia was constantly in direct opposition 
to Russia. She wished to keep Persia as a buffer 
state rather than a direct policy of colonization. 
On May 15. 1903, Lord Lansdowne stated in the House 
of Lords that the British policy in the Persian Gulf 
was to protect and promote British trade in those 
waters, and While her efforts were not directed to-
wards the exclusion of the legitimate trade of other 
Powers, she "should regard the establishment of a 
naval base or of a fortified port in the Persian 
Gulf by any other power as a very grave menace to 
1 
Cit. G. & T., Vol. IV, p. 371. (Parl. Deb., 'th 







British interests, and we should certainly resist it 
1 
with all the means at our disposal." 
The Government of Persia realized that the only 
hope tor reoovery lay in maintaining and aggravating 
bad relations between Great Britain and Russia, and 
the atmosphere at Teheran was one of distrust and 
dislike. The diplomats of both countries realized 
that it was necessary to reach same sort of agreement, 
for they had come very often to the verge of war be-
cause of their mutual misunderstanding. Russia was 
France's ally; Great Britain had a policy of agree-
ment with France, and a policy of counter~alliances 
against Russia. There was no third power near the 
Indian frontier to aid England in the oppression and 
control of Russian advance. Thus it seems that some 
sort of agreement with Russia would be the natural 
and necessary complement of the British agreement with 
2 
France. Suoh was the situation, and it was evident 
that nothing less than a cordial agreement could pre-
Tent it from getting worse. "Unless the mists of 
suspicion were dissolved by the warm air of friend-
ship, the increasing friotion would cause Britain and 
3 
Russia to drift toward war." 
1 
Sir A. W. Ward and Gooch, The cambridge History 
~ British Forei~n Poliol, Vol. !II, pp. 32 -321. 
2Grey• Vol. I, p. 141. 
3 








In Thibet, the territorial aspirations of the two 
oountries olashed. Aggression and unneighbourly con-
duct on the part of the Thibetan peoples were the 
immediate causes of the Convention signed at Calcutta 
on Maroh 17, 1890, by Great Britain and China; but 
the relations between the Government of India and that 
of Thibet were in no way improved by this convention. 
Trade was ~peded, letters from the Viceroy were un-
answered, and Russian intrigues were suspected. In a 
dispatch dated January 8, 1903, the Government of In-
dia argued that BritiSh interests were "seriously i~ 
perilled •••• by the absolute breakdown of the Treaty 
arrangements hitherto made through the medium of China, 
by the obstructive inertia of the Thibetans themselves, 
and still more by the arrangements freshly concluded 
1 
with another Great Power to our detriment. If India 
urged an expedi tion to Lhassa and the appointment of 
a British resident there. The Younghusband Mission 
orossed the frontier and marohed into Lhassa on August 
3, 1904. A month later, on September 7, Tb1bet signed 
an agreement agreeing to observe the Anglo-Chinese Con-
vention of 1890, to ereot boundary pillars, to open 
trade marts in three places, to maintain an agent at 
each of the places, Gyantese, Gartok, and Yatung, to 
1 




torward communications, to keep open the roads leading 
to them, and to raze all forts on the routes to the 
oapitol. The ninth and last article was aimed at the 
Russian menace: 
The Government of Thibet engages that with-
out the previOUS consent of the British Government,-
(a). no portion ot Thibetan territory shall 
be ceded, sold, leased, mortgaged or 
otherwise given tor occupation, to any 
Foreign Power; 
(b). no such Power shall be permitted to 
intervene in Thibetan affairs; 
(c). no Representatives or Agents of any 
Foreign Power shall be admitted to 
Thibet; 
(d). no concessions for railways, roads, 
telegraphs, mining or other rights, 
shall be granted to an7 Foreign Power, 
or the subject of any Foreign Power. 
In the event ot consent to such con-
cessions being granted, similar or 
equivalent concessions shall be 
granted to the British Government; 
(e). no Thibetan revenues, whether in kind 




assigned to any Foreign Power, or the 
subject of any Foreign Power. 
Younghusband thus secured all his political and econo-
mic requirements, and he acquiesced in Article VI that 
the indemnity which was fixed at ~ five hundred thou-
sand be payed in seventy-five annual instalments. 
This change necessitated that Great Britain shall con-
tinue to occupy the Chumbi valley until the indemnity 
1 
shall be paid. Russia viewed the Convention very un-
favorably as she had the Younghusband Mission, but she 
was too weakened by war in Manchuria to offer any ser-
2 
ious resistance. In this way we see how the Russian 
menace on the northern part of the glacis was warded 
off, and further negotiations between Great Britain 
and Ru~~1a were interrupted by the advent of war be-
tween Japan and Russia. It was: not until 1906, that 
further conciliatory negotiations were begun. 
Russian and British ambitions clashed so directly 
in the Far East that at the end of the nineteenth cen-
tury the rivalry was of such:intensity as:to make the 
danger of open conflict 1mminent. Russian history in 
the Far East goes. back to the seventeenth century, when 
in her first expansion to the Pacific sea-board, she 
1 
G. & T. Treaty Text. pp. 314-317. 
2 






rounded the town of Okhotsk. Into the vast territory 
which Russia thus claimed, poured roving banils of 
Cossack frontiersmen, gold-seekers, fur-hunters, 
traders, political out-laws and discontented serfs. 
Siberia, they discovered, was not a land of "milk and 
honey." The north was an inhospitable expanse of 
marches, frozen in winter; forests of central Siber-
ia might delight the hunter but not the farmer; and 
while in the south farming was pOSSible, extreme heat 
in summer and biting cold in winter made life un-
pleasant. tlor was the Russian desire for a Pacific 
port satisfied with Okhotsk, ice-bound in winter. 
Hoping to discover more fertile far.m-lands and seek-
ing for a better sea-port, Russian explorers, adven-
turers, and settlers began in the seventeenth century 
to invade the valley of the Amur RiVer, in northern 
Manchuria, which was then held by the emperor or 
China. Russia did not begin her attack on the inte-
gri ty of China until the middle of the nineteenth 
century, when, in pursuit or an ice-free port, she 
began to extend her possessions southward. In 1860 
Russia established the naval base of Vladivostok at 
the southern end of a strip of land known as the 
Maritime Province, which had been acquired from China. 
But Vladivostok is not an ice-free harbour and Russia 
, 
17 
looked still further south for further accessions of 
territory. Even before the close of the nineteenth 
century, Russian merchants had begun to settle in the 
cities of Chinese Manchuria. After 1895, when Russia 
intervened to keep Japan out of southern Manchuria, 
it appeared inevitable that Manchuria, with its naval 
base at Port Arthur, and possibly Korea also, would 
ultimately fall under Russian domination. Japan, 
however, by the War of 1904-1905, forced the Russians 
to renounce Port Arthur and Korea. 
Great Britain first became interested in the Far 
East in 1842. Up to that time, China had maintained 
her isolation from the rest of the world. Foreigners 
were prohibited from trading in all ports except Can-
ton, and here the restrictions were so rigid that no 
country was able to carry on a regular commerce. No 
foreign ambassadors or consuls were allowed to reside 
in China. But the time came when the Chinese Govern-
ment found itself powerless to prevent European mer-
chants from trafficking in Chinese ports, Christian 
missionaries from preaching their gospel, and foreign 
capitalists from building railways, opening mines, and 
erecting factories within China. In 1840 this wall be-
tween the ancient oriental world and the modern world 




waged by Great Britain against China. It grew out of 
a quarrel between the Chinese Government, which had 
prohibited the importation of opium, and ,the BritiSh 
traders at Canton, Who insisted on smuggling opium 
from India to China. In June, 1840, a British fleet 
attacked the Chinese coast and captured the cities of 
Canton, Amoy, Ningpo, Shanghai, and Chin-Kiang. 
Finally the emperor was compelled to sign the treaty 
of Nanking (1842), whereby the four ports of Amoy, 
Ningpo, Foochow, and Shanghai, in addition to Canton, 
were thrown open to foreign traders. Great Britain 
also secured the island of Hongkong. 
During the next twenty years Great Britain ac-
quired many other privileges, including the right to 
maintain British consuls in the ports designated by 
the treaty, and a rapid increase was made in her Far 
Eastern trade and her influence on the Pacific grew 
proportionally. Great Britain's victory was rapidly 
shared by traders fram other nations, and Chinese 
trade grew by leaps and bounds. Great Britain remain-
ed the predominant power in the Far East, on the one 
hand because of her possession of Hongkong, which had 
become the most important naval and commercial base 
on the Pacific coast, and on the other hand because 
of her innate initiative and activity. 
• 
19 
Meanwhile the progressive little island empire 
of Japan was beginning to claim a share in the spo-
liation of the Chinese Empire. Japan's policy of 
isolation, to which she had long adhered, was broken 
down as a result of Commodore Perry's visit in 1854, 
when he brought them the wonderful inventions of 
western civilization. Japan soon entered into ne-
gotiations with foreign nations. Japan became a 
modern power within two decades, whose material 
efficiency was proven by her victories over China in 
1894 and over Russia in 1904-05. 
In the latter part of the nineteenth century, by 
continual interference in Korean affairs, the Japanese 
embroiled China in a series of quarrels. Finally, 
when China sent troops to Korea at the invitation of 
the King, and reasserted her claims to suzerainty 
over the kingdom, a body of Japanese soldiers seized 
the king and prepared for war with China (1894). The 
war, known to history as the Chino-Japanese War of 
1894-1895, was simply a succession of catastrophies 
for the over-confident China. The triumphant Japanese 
forces were ready to advance on Pekin when peace was 
made by the treaty of Shimonoseki, 17 April, 1895. 
In addition to a war indemnity of $157,940,000, Japan 




and to the Liao-tung peninsula, including the coveted 
naval base of Port Arthur, and jmportant commercial 
concessions. Wei-hai-wei, moreover, was to be held 
by Japan until the treaty stipulations had been 
faithfully executed. China renounced all claim to 
the Kingdom of Korea, whiCh now gradually passed under 
the tutelage of Japan. 
Japan's gains were grievous to Russia, and she was 
not long allowed to enjoy the fruits of her victory. 
For Russian expansionists had hoped eventually to annex 
Manchuria, Korea, and Port Arthur, in this wa7, giving 
to Russia an ice-free outlet in the Far East and pre-
dominance in northern Asia. To this ambition the 
treaty of Shimonoseki spelled defeat. The Russian 
government, therefore, resolved to tear up the obnox-
ious treaty. It was not difficult to gain the co8per-
ation of Germany and France, and all acting together, 
they invoked the principle of Chinese integrity, and 
forced Japan to surrender her conquests on the main-
land. Japan swallowed her disappointment, yielded to 
their demands. and renounced the acquisition of the 
Liao-tung peninsula and Port Arthur. But the Japanese 
were furiously disappointed, and they long remembered 
who had cheated Japan of the fruits of victory. 
The whole affair was a European intrigue for in-






the coup. Russian influence became all powerful in 
Pekin; and Russian capitalists loaned China $80,000, 
000. Russia seoured the right to carry her trans-
Siberian railway across Chinese Manchuria to Vladi-
Tostok,--- a right which practioally gave Manohuria 
into Russia's hands, sinoe Russian infantry and 
cavalry would aocompany the railway into Manchuria. 
FUrthermore, Russia obtained a lease (1898) of Port 
Arthur and the neighboring harbor of Talien-wan, which 
were immediately linked up by railway with the trans-
Siberian syste~ The telegraph lines of Korea were 
likewise connected with the Siberian lines. It is 
rather obvious that Russia once more regarded Man-
churia, Korea, and the Liao-tung peninsula as her 
"sphere'of influence." The Germans in 1897 seized 
the bay of Kiao-Chau in the province of Shan-tung, 
with the flimsy excuse that only in this manner could 
Germany obtain satisfaction for the murder of two Ger-
man missionaries in China. The real intention of the 
Germans became clear, however, when they ex.torted a 
ninety-nine year lease of Kiao-chau and began to for-
tif,. the place as a base for German power in the pro-
vince of Shan-tung. 
The steady advance of Russia in the Far East had 
been the cause of much anxiety to the British States-








East was threatened. Much of" the northern Chinese 
trade was falling into Russ ian hands, and in the mean-
time Russia had been increasing her military hold on 
Manchuria. It looked as though Russia might annex 
Manchuria, and Great Britain knew that this meant the 
closing of Manchuria to British trade. 
It was just at this time that Great Britain was 
very occupied in South Africa with the Boer War, and 
she realized that She needed an ally very badly in the 
Far East. Japan, like Great Britain, was beginning to 
feel the effects of absolute isolation. Negotiations 
were carried on in London by Lord Lansdowne and Baron 
Hayashi, the Japanese Ambassador, and in January, 1902, 
2 
a treaty was signed for five years. ·The two govern-
ments recognized the independence of China and Korea; 
but they authorized each other to safeguard their 
special interests by intervention if threatened either 
by the aggression of another Power or by internal dis-
turbances. If either power in defence of such inter-
ests, became involved in war, the other would maintain 
s§rict neutrality. If, however, either were to be at 
1 
G. & T. Vol. II. pp. 89-91. 
~ 
G. & T. Vol. II. pp. 89-137, (diplomatic nego-











The Anglo-Japanese treaty did not stipulate that 
Great Britain Should assist Japan in a war against 
Russia, but it naturally resulted in an increase of 
animosity between the two rivals. Through this 
alliance Japan was given prestige which no other 
Oriental country had eve~ attained, and Great Bri-
tain was strengthened socially and politically by the 
knowledge that she did not stand alo~. 
As it became more and more clear that the Russian 
government intended practically to annex Manchuria, 
the resent£Ul Japanese resolved to check their rival b7 
force of arms. The Russo-Japanese war resulted in 
1904-1905, and victory again attended the Japanese. By 
the treaty of Portsmouth (5 September, 1905) Russia 
acknowledged the Japanese interests as supreme in 
2 
Korea, and yielded to Japan some 500 miles of railway. 
Great Britain took no part in the war, but her sympa-
thies were for her Ally and against her enemy of suoh 
duration. It was at this time that the possibilities 
of open conflict between England and Russia was most 
imminent since the Berlin Congress of 1878. War was 
1 
G. & T. Vol. II. 
draft. 
pp. 115-139 complete treaty 
2 







avoided between the two nations by the skillful dip-
lomaoy of diplomats on both sides, for negotiations 
were beginning to be made for same sort of Anglo-
1 
Russian Entente. The Anglo-Russian trade was in-
oreasing and neither nation wished to impair it. 
Another important factor was that both nations were 
well aware of the benefits which Germany would reap 
fram an open conflict between Great Britain and 
Russia. "In the extraordinary development of Ger-
many is to be found the explanation of the continual 
and sucoessful efforts of the diplomats to avoid an 
2 
open break between RUssia and England. 
It was not quite so easy to create a new friend-
ship with Russia as it had been with France. Something 
was always happening that alienated British sympathy 
and stirred BritiSh indignation against Russia. The 
change of Government in England from Conservative to 
Liberal in the early part of 1906 probably delayed the 
negotiations with Russia, as the Liberals were much 
more suspicious of the autocratic Tsar than were their 
predecessors. The establishment of the institution of 
a Duma had done a little to make even the British 
3 
Liberals more sJl1lpathetio. A large amount of money 
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was needed by the governing classes of Russia to keep 
the Duma at bay, and to tide the country through the 
aftermath of financial depression which resulted from 
the war with Japan. When Witte became Prime Minister 
on October 20. 1905, he at once began negotiations 
1 
for an international loan. It was expeeted that 
France would contribute the largest share, but her 
hands were tied by the Morocco criSis, and it was not 
until after the Algeciras Conference that the contract 
for the loan was signed on April 3. The money was used 
to terrorize the Duma and the enterprise was successful. 
Representatives of the Duma visited London to take part 
in a meeting of the International Parliamentary Repre-
sentatives. This would be a golden opportunity for 
the British Prime Minister to make a friendly reference 
2 
to Russia. The news of the suspension of the Duma 
reached London on the eve of the meeting, and the 
occasion turned fram one most auspicious to one ex-
tremely awkward. The one feature whi ch saved the si tu-
ation was that the Tsar had not abolished the Duma, 
but had only suspended it. Campbell-Bannerman added 
to his inaugural address a resonant warning to the 
Russian Government and a message of hope to the 
1 
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Russian people. "La Duma est morte. Vive la DumaJ", 
which did not facilitate the work of Grey, Hardinge 
1 
and Nicolson. Finally though, the gulf was bridged, 
owing apparently more to the eagerness and pressure of 
2 
the British, rather than the Russian, Foreign Office. 
Later in the same year (1906) there was a suggest-
ed visit by a British naval squadron to Cronstad. This 
aroused much dispute among the Liberals in the House 
of Commons and caused embarrassment in the Foreign 
Office likewise. For Great Britain to have cancelled 
the fleet's visit would have been a rebuff to Russia 
which would have prejudiced further the relations be-
tween the two countries. Finally the suggestion was 
vetoed by the Emperor Nicholas II, and his reasons 
3 
given in a telegram of July 12, 1906, to King Edward. 
These incidents go to show what a difficult and 
delicate business it was to put the relations of 
Great Britain with Russia on a sure foundation Which 
would be solid and yet friendly. Also the internal 
affairs of Russia rendered a most unfavorable attitude 
1 
Lee. Vol. II, pp. 566-568. 
2 
This at any rate was the impression of German 
observers; of G. P., Vol. XXV, 5, 21, 54, 67. 
3 





to friendly negotiations; but British remonstrance 
did no good. A British Government had once addressed 
same remonstrance to Russia about internal affairs, 
and the Russian Government had retorted with remarks 
1 
about the state of Ireland. There were also di8-
covered plots and intrigues which were meant to sow 
seeds of suspicion in the Russian minds against 
2 
Great Britain. 
Nevertheless, it was still very essential that 
both countries come to some sort of agreement, the one 
with the other. It was in 1907, that the negotiations 
were finally taken seriously in hand,--- but we will 
leave the story of these negotiations for a later 
chapter. 
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FACTORS DRAWING !!GLAND ~ RUSSIA TOGETHER 
When war was threatened between Great Britain 
1 
and Russia over the Dogger Bank incident~ there were 
two factors which prevented the outbreak then. One 
was the Anglo-French Entente which was just then 
crystallizing; the other was the fear of France and 
England that a Russo-German entente would be estab-
lished. The Kaiser had been encouraging and in-
spiring the Tsar to believe that "Russia must and 
will win" in the war with Japan~ and he very warmly 
urged upon Russia a Russo-German entente as he was 
2 
very anti-British. This was a source of great an-
xiety for France, for it was a menace to her and the 
Franco-Russian Entente of 1891, which ripened into 
the Alliance of 1894. This rapprochement between 
them~ in spite of the fundamental contrast between 
the republican and absolutist form of government at 
Paris and st. Petersburg~ was the obvious counter-
balance to the Triple Alliance, and noW it might very 
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easily fall to pieces and leave France isolated on 
the continent again. The Franco-Russian Alliance was 
aimed primarily at Germany, should the latter attempt 
any sort of aggressive policy, but it did not arouse 
much suspicion across the Rhine, for Germany felt se-
cure in the strength of the Triple Alliance. On the 
other hand, if Russia were to ally herself with Ger-
many, the Triple Alliance would become a Quadruple 
Alliance, and the balance of power in Europe would 
totter. Arbitration was the only possible solution 
in such a case as that of the Dogger Bank, and it was 
in this means that France was entirely successful. As 
soon as England consented to arbitrate the case, the 
danger of war was over and the future Entente was made 
I 
possible. After this, France set herself to building 
up the long desired alliance between the three p~wers 
and against Germany. 
It was this intense fear which actuated the French 
/ Minister of Foreign Affairs, Delcasse, to bring heavy 
pressure to bear upon England in order to keep peace 
with Russia. He made up his mind, and kept it for his 
seven years in office, to bring England and France into 
1 







• . . . 
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31 
effective accord. This was his policy throughout his 
tenure in ofrice~ and to him all credit is due for the 
1 
initiating of the Anglo-French Entente. 
In the spring of 1903, King EdwaI'd made hi s first 
formal visit to Paris as King, and was well received, 
though until the time of his arrival, the press and 
public opinion were rather dubious as to his reception. 
The German Ambassador to France, in a letter dated 
April 20, 1903, to Count van Bulaw, described the sit-
uation very adequately: 
tIThe nearer we approaoh towards the day of the 
King of England's arrival, the more energetically do 
the nationalist papers oppose an Anglo-French Alliance •• 
"From my own observations I had gained the im-
pression that the journey of King Edward will lead to 
a detente in the up-to-now not very favourable rela-
tions between France and England at which they aim 
strongly at the Quai d'Orsay, and that France still 
holds fast now, as before, in the first line to a 
Russian alliance. 
"The general impression is this: 'King Edward 
will be given a courtly and a brilliant reception, 
but it will not came up to the same inspired enthu-
1 








siaam as was witnessed during the visit of the Tsar.,n 
In one of his very tactful speechs in which he 
knew how to combine flattering appreciation and hearty 
personal good-will, by means of which he won so many 
personal friends, the King declared to the French 
people: 
"It is hardly necessary for me to say with what 
sincere pleasure I find myself once more in Paris, 
WhiCh, as you know, I have very frequently visited in 
the past with a pleasure that continually increases, 
with an affection strengthened by old and happy asso-
ciations that time can never efface •••• 
"The days of conflict between the two countries 
are, I ~rus t, happily over, and I hope that future 
historians, in alluding to Anglo-French relations in 
the present century, may be able to record only a 
friendly rivalry in the field of commercial and indus-
trial developments, and that in the future, as in the 
past, England and France may be regarded as the cham-
pions and as the homes of all that is best and noblest 
in literature, art, and science. 
tI A Divine Providence has designed that France 
should be our near neighbour, and, I hope, always a 
1 








dear friend. There are no two countries in the world 
whose mutual prosperity 1s more dependent on each 
other. There may have been misunderstandings and causes 
of dissension in the past, but all such differences are, 
I believe, happily removed and forgotten, and I trust 
that the friendship and admiration Which we all feel 
for the French nation and their glorious traditions . 
may in the near future develop into a sentiment of the 
war.mest affection and attachment between the peoples 
of the two countries. The achievement of this aim is 
my constant desire, and, gentlemen, I count upon your 
institution and each of its members severally who re-
side in this beautiful city and enjoy the hospitality 
of the French Republic to aid and assist me in the 
1 
attainment of this object." 
Germany alone looked upon the very cordial re-
ception of King Edward with mistrust and suspicion, 
and in a letter of June 2, 1903, to Bu15w, the German 
Ambassador wondered if it was not a blow at Germany, 
2 
and he considered the visit "a most odd affair", but 
it was one of the greatest forward steps in the crea-
tion of the Anglo-French Entente. 
1 
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The negotiations finally culminated into three 
separate conventions, WhiCh, though they were of 
different significance, comprised one single diplo-
matic instrument. The credit for initiating the 
Anglo-French Entente of 1904 must be given to M. 
Delcass$; the credit for bringing the negotiations 
34 
to a successfUl cu1mination·must be given to Lord 
Lansdowne and M. Cambon; and finally the credit for 
influencing public opinion both in England and France, 
and the credit for the creating of the proper atmos-
phere necessary for the completion of such a treaty 
1 
must go to King Edward VII. 
This Alliance between France and England was an 
ineYitable result of circumstance. In the face of 
the growing conflict between Japan and Russia, cul-
minating in the outbreak of war between the two na-
tions in February, 1904, and because of the fact that 
Great Britain was allied to Japan and France to 
Russia, it was evidently very important that friendly 
relations should be established with France in order 
to prevent the war in the Far East from spreading in-
to Europe and to keep it fran involving Englani and 
France against one another. England earnestly hoped 
to blot out the numerous causes of fri"ction which had 
1 
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80 ~requent1y brought her to the verge of war with 
1 
France in the past. On the other side France was 
determined that she would not be brought into the 
war because of the territorial ambitions of her 
Slavic ally in the Far East. France wanted to be 
friendly with England in order to build up an a11i-
35 
ance with power enough to counterbalance the Triple 
Alliance. Russia had not given the support to France 
and seemed to be of less value to her than had been 
anticipated at the time of the for.mation of the 
Alliance. "Delcass~ had no thought o~ abandoning the 
alliance with Russia, but be believed that closer re-
lations with England would help to compensate France 
2 
for the lessened value of the Franco-Russian Allianoe." 
The Anglo-FrenCh Entente was followed by very 
important but secret naval and military arrapgements, 
whiCh gradually came to be, in fact if not in form, a 
3 
most vital link in the system of secret alliances. 
In these conversations, the FrenCh and BritiSh naval 
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and ~litary authorities tended to draw up plans for 
joint action in case Germany were to cause a European 
war. It was stated that these conversations were not 
1 
to be binding to either Government, though Mr. Fay 
argues that they came to involve mutual obligations 
2 
which were just as entangling as a formal alliance. 
The rather sudden reconciliation of Great Bri-
tain and Russia was encouraged and facilitated by the 
feelings each of the nations held for Germany. Great 
Britain was afraid of the rapid economic development 
of Germany, and ahe believed that she was directly 
3 
threatened by the German world policy. Her suspi-
cions were greatly aroused against Germany by the 
Krager telegram trouble in South Africa, and though 
it was not a diplomatic incident, it had its effect 
upon the contour of the British mind. Late in 1895, 
Dr. Jameson attempted a raid into the Transval terri-
tory of South Africa, which ended in failure in a few 
days. President Krfiger, who was watching for the 
maturation of the plot, arrested the leaders and had 
them sentenced to heavy penalties, all of which were 
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ultimately remitted. The commotion created by the 
raid was suddenly intensified by a more significant 
sensation which was created by a telegram from the 
Emperor Wi11imm II to President Krager. On January 
3 the Kaiser dispatched the following te1egrmm to 
Kriiger: "I heartily congratulate you on the fact 
that you and your people, without appealing to the 
aid of friendly Powers, have succeeded by your un-
aided efforts in restoring peace and preserving the 
independence of the country against the armed bands 
which broke into your land." "I express to Your Ma-
jesty my deepest gratitude for Your Majesty's con-
gratulations," replied the President. "With God's 
help we hope to continue to do everything possible 
1 
for the existence of our Republic." Mr. GooCh fur-
ther points out the indignation which the Kaiser's 
telegram excited in England. He quotes the Morning 
~ as saying: "The nation will never forget this 
telegram, and it will always bear it in mind in the 
future orientation of its policy." The suspicion 
grew, later on, that Germany had been encouraging 
President Krijger in his increasing uncompromising 
attitude in order to create more trouble for Great 
2 
Britain in South Africa, and the recollection of the 
1 
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telegram strengthened and antagonized the suspicion 
in later and more dangerous years. 
The British Government from 1895 to 1905 was 
under the control of the Conservative Party ~-- that 
party which traditionally extolled imperialism, a 
big navy, and a vigorous foreign policy. They were 
frightened at the rapid growth industrially and commer-
cially, and the emergence of Germany as a World Power 
did not moderate this fright. Germany, who was support-
ed by William II, began about the olose of the nine-
teenth oentury, to build a large navy whiCh oompelled 
Great Britain, if she was to retain her maritime su-
premaoy, to hasten her naval building and inorease 
her expenditure. These polioies oaused the former 
friendly relations between the two countries to give 
way to popular jealousy, reorimination and fear. 
German suspioion of England was definitely aroused 
at the time of the Second Hague Conferenoe 1906-1908, 
beoause she feared that Great Britain was trying to 
impede naval development to her own benefit. The 
Kaiser remained hostile throughout to the issue of 
disarmament, and when it was raised in the Conference, 
opposition to it was voiced by the German delegates. 
Sir John Fisher had just reorganized and strengthened 
the British fleet in 1904 with his polioy of "Ruthless , 
r, 





Relentless and RemorselessJ" This was about the 
time that the German navy was beginning to grow in 
power and Admiral Tirpitz was advocating a "risk 
navy. n ttlt seemed to prevent Germany from catching 
up in strength at a moment when England still enjoyed 
2 
a marked naval superiority." Long before Great 
Britain began to have suspicion of the German navy, 
Germany was skeptical and felt alarm at the size of 
the British fleet, but the Kaiser talked only of 
Germany" s need for a navy which would contribute 
powerfully to make strong the feeling of unity in 
the mosaic pattern of the empire but which was not 
3 
intended for attacking others. Admiral von Tirpitz 
did not anticipate the psychological effect his "risk 
navy" would have upon Great Britain. Every increase 
in the navy of Germany, instead of frightening the 
British into making concessions, tended to increase 
their opposition and their determination to keep the 
wide margin of the naval superiority of Great Britain 
1 
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which was considered vital to the safety and existence 
1 
of the British Empire. 
The futility of such superabundant ar.maments and 
great Kaval expenditures was realized by a few of the 
great diplomats of the time, but mob psychology seemed 
to demand it, and all negotiations Which were made for 
disar.mament were ruthlessly rejected by Ger.many. In 
a speech on December 21, 1905, Sir Henry Campbell-
Bannerman had lamented the great expenditures on ar-
maments: "A policy of huge armaments keeps alive and 
stimulates and feeds the belief that force is the best, 
if not the only, solution of international differences. 
It is a policy that tends to inflame old sores and to 
create new sores •••• We want relief from the pressure 
of excessive taxation, and at the same time we want 
money for our domestic needs at home, which have been 
too long starved and neglected, owing to the demands 
on the tax payer for military purposes abroad. How 
are these desirable things to be secured, if in time 
of peace our armaments are maintained on a war foot-
ing?" The inevitable result of this policy was 
realized when war finally broke out in 1914. 
Germany was largely responsible for Russia's ag-
gressive policy in the Far East which finally culminated 
1 







in a shattered dream of Russian domination in China 
and Manchuria. When she saw the futility of a Far 
Eastern enterprise, Russia turned towards the Balkan. 
and the Straits for an outlet. Here she was halted 
when her ambitions conflicted with Germany's desire 
to have control of territory extending fram the North 
Sea to the Persian Gulf. One could hardly conceive 
of the forces of Pan-Slavism not conflicting with 
those of Pan-Germanism in the Near East. 
It was felt in the Rus8~an diplomatic circles 
that there was a growing change in the Russian sent.-
ment t awards Germany after the Russo-Japanese War 
and the sympathy which formally pervaded between the 
two was waning. In a letter of 13 June, 1905, Sir 
Charles Hardinge writes to the Marquess of Lansdowne: 
"The impression seems to prevail that the German Em-
peror has been fishing in troubled waters and that 
having displayed excessive friendliness towards 
Russia while there was a hope that Russian ar.ms 
might yet be victorious, and having profited by this 
appearance of friendliness to float a Russian loan 
on highly advantageous terms for German finanCiers, 
and to obtain large orders for military and naval 
stores of every kind, the fulfillment of which had 






a neutral Power, His Majesty has diverted his sympa-
thy from Russia to Japan as the rising power with 
whom it would now be more profitable to enter into 
1 
closer and more friendly relations." He reiterates 
in this letter several other factors which helped to 
widen the breach between Russia and Germany, ---the 
Morocco question and the Kaiser's telegram to the 
Russian Emperor oonoerning the necessity of the French 
Government to oome to some agreement; the unwarranted 
attaok on the honour and integrity of the Russian &r.my; 
and finally the fall of M. Deloasse was regarded in 
Russia as an act backed by Germany_ These inoidents, 
and the restlessness and feveri~h energy of the German 
Emperor, helped to impress the Russian Emperor of the 
little dependence which could be placed ~n Germany, 
and he began to realize the necessity of having a 
strong ally to help defend his Eastern front. 
Izvolski saw that Russia was very weakened by her 
disastrous conflict with Japan in the Far East, and he 
realized that in comparison with the ever growing pres-
tige of the Triple Alliance, the Franco-Russian Alli-
ance appeared very insignificant. As it stood, then, 
to be of any vital significance, it needed the strength 
1 
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which closer relations with Great Britain would give 
to both France and Russia and their Alliance. Russia, 
in her very weakened condition, feared a renewed 
attack from Japan in the Far East, for Japan had 
made very humiliating demands after the war, and was 
..c suspected to be preparing for a new struggle. 
Russia realized her only chance for rehabilitation 
lay in long years of peace. To do this, it was necess-
ary to keep Japan quiet and pacified, and Russia under-
took to reach this goal b.1 making a friendly agreement 
with Japan concerning spheres of interests :in Manchuria. 
England was the natural bridge between Russia and Japan, 
for the latter had been Englandts ally since 1902, and 
an approchement with Japan would give a more solid basis 
and impetus to the Franco-Rus sian Alliance. 
Russia was confronted by the possibility of another 
danger --- that of a conflict of interests with Great 
Britain in the Near and Central East. Russians still 
remembered the Crimean War, and the strained circum-
stances in 1878 when the Straits were threatened by 
the British Fleet. In 1885 the Pendjeh attair nearly 
culminated in war between the two countries, and more 
recently the various incidents of the Russo-Japanese 







antagonism between the two countries. If Russia were 
to have another conflict with Great Britain l it would 
cast her (Russia) into the clutches of Germany and 
would endanger the now weak Franco-Russian Alliance 
1 
which Russia had made the foundation of her policy. 
Russia would have an opportunity to strengthen her 
own international position if she could become friends 
with England and forget past antipathies l and she 
might be able to establish a more active policy in the 
Balkans. Such an agreement would be welcomed by 
France, who, in her position in the heart of European 
broils, would be glad to see her new and her old friend 
becoming allies. It was with these thoughts in his mind 
that Izvolski determined upon the program of his policy 
as he became the Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs in 
1906. 
After the Russo-Japanese War the relations between 
Russia and England were gradually improving. At the 
close of a long letter to the Marquess of Lansdowne, 
on September 6, 1905, Sir Charles Hardinge gives a very 
good survey of the general Anglo-Russian relations from 
the war until the writing of the letter. He says: "I 
need hardly remind Your Lordship of the campaign of 
malicious lies and misrepresentations which was initia-
1 





ted against Great Britain simultaneously with the 
outbreak of war and Which lasted during the first 
year of its progress, commencing with the reported 
utilization of Wei-hei-wei as the base from which 
the Japanese fleet made their attack on the Russian 
fleet at Port Arthur on the 8th of February and cul-
minating with the accusations levelled against the 
Hull fishermen of complicity in an attack by imagi-
nary torpedo-boats on the Baltic fleet, nor is it 
necessary for me to recapitulate all the serious in-
cidents which have occurred during the past eighteen 
months and which on more than one occasion have 
strained the relations existing between the two coun-
tries almost to the breaking pOint. During all this 
period the position of His Majesty's Embassy has been 
one of difficulty while that of British subjects re-
siding in Russia has not been without personal risk, 
owing to the bitter hostility and incitement of the 
Chauvinistic press against England and all that was 
English. The firm attitude of His Majesty's Govern-
ment in openly refuting the baseless charges made 
against their policy and officials, the determined 
remonstrances addressed to the Russian Government 
against the illegal actions of their naval officers, 
• 
and finally the temperate proposal of arbitration 
after an unprecedented outburst of warlike indig-
nation owing to the unfortunate incident on the 
Dogger Bank, which was eventually proved to have 
been an unwarrent_ble attack on harmless British 
fishing-vessels, thus avoiding What would have 
46 
been a useless and unprofitable war, all these 
causes have tended to impress the Russian Government 
and Russian public opinion with a more favourable 
idea of the dignity and impartiality with Which His 
Majesty's Government faithfully discharged their 
obligations of neutrality not only towards Russia 
but also towards their Japanese allies. The loyalty 
of His Majesty's Government to that of France during 
the recent Morocco incident had also afforded a use-
ful object lesson which has had due effect, and I 
have no hesitation in asserting my opinion that dur-
ing the past six months there has been a decided ~­
provement in public sentiment towards England, that 
the bitter hostility which was daily displayed in 
the Russian preas had almost entirely disappeared, 
and that the relations between the two countries are 
now on a more friendly footing than has been the case 
I 
since the outbreak of war." 
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Great Britain had witnessed the Russian re£or.m 
movement o£ 1905 with much sympathy and anticipated 
the opening o£ the Duma in 1906 with satisfaction. 
1 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the £ailure o£ 
this enterprise caused a bridge between the two coun-
tries which was important but which was soon counter-
acted, and negotiations £or an alliance o£ some sort 
were continued between Russia and Great Britain. 
Some of the leading statesmen o£ Great Britain 
realized the advantages which. were to be gained by a 
substitution of cooperation with Russia £or the former 
deadlock in the imperialistic aims of each country in 
Asia. King Edward favored an agreement with Russia, 
£or he realized that here could be no permanent se-
curity while Russian and British designs were in con-
flict in Persia, Afghanistan, and China. Since the 
early days o£ 1904, he had lost no opportunity of en-
couraging and furthering a cordial understanding be-
2 
tween them on these three important questions. 
Sir Edward Grey acknowledged that reconciliation 
and negotiations with Russia were hard, but he recog-
nized the £act that this mighty Empire needed and was 
1 
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ever seeking an outlet to a sea that did not freeze. 
He enumerated the many incidents in which Russia was 
blocked when she was striving for an outlet in the 
Near East, Central and Far East and wondered it it 
was "possible ever to have peace, and quiet, or in-
deed to have anything but recurrent triction with 
1 
Russia on such terms." 
Sir Charles Hardinge was another ardent advocate 
of a rapprochement with Russia. In 1904 he was Bri-
tish Ambassador at st. Petersburg, but was recalled 
in 1905 to became Permanent Under Secretary. He 
made a great effort both in st. Petersburg and Lon-
don that his reoall should present him with an oppor-
tunity to work with greater acoord that the Anglo-
Russian relations should be a greater success. When 
he came back to London he influenced Sir Edward Grey 
with much pro-Russian sentiment and he was backed by 
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GENERAL ANGLO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS 1903-1907 
. 
Part I 
The First stages of the AnglO-Russian Rapprochement 
1903-1904 
It was clearly reoognized both at home and abroad 
that 'the Anglo-Frenoh Convention which was just being 
projeoted at the end of 1903, required a fuller and 
better understanding between Russia and England in or-
der to be a success. There were many difficulties 
which stoo. in the way of suCh negotiations. The ra-
ther ourious diplomatic oircle of European states 
caused muoh confusion. To a casual observer of dip-
lomaoy, it seemed as if Europe was about to be divided 
into two camps --- Germany, Austria and Italy versus 
1 
Great Britain, Franoe and Russia. The greatest point 
of difficulty in such an arrangement of camps lay in 
the fact that the antagonisms between Japan and Russia 
were becoming more intense, and Russia felt the Ang1o-
Japanese Alliance to be a thing which was not to be 
trusted. 
1 





King Edward was rather skeptical, and though he 
had had a life-long suspicion of Russia, he began to 
turn his attention towards such negotiations as would 
be deemed necessary for friendlier relations. Count 
Benckendorff, the new Russian Ambassador at London, 
was his guest at Windsor in November 1903, and a few 
days later he told Lord Lansdowne that he "had been 
very much impressed by the earnestness of the King's 
conversation with him in favour of a friendly under-
1 
standing." 
In a letter to the Marquess of Lansdowne dated 
November 22, 1903, Mr. Hardinge writes of a conver-
sation he had with Count Benckendorff which threw 
some light on the aspirations of Russia in ASia, and 
how far and what possible concessions Russia would 
make in order to meet British views. Mr. Hardinge 
explained to him the British policy in Asia --- that 
for many years it had been the maintenance of the 
status quo, while that of the Russian government had 
been aggressive in China, Persia and Afghanistan. 
The Russian Ambassador said that the time was riper 
now (1903) than it had been at any time for twenty 
years or more, for a friendly understanding between 
1 
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England and Russia. He presented the Russian idea 
that Manchuria Should be disoussed as a question 
where Russian interests were preponderant, Central 
Asia fram the point of view of the defense of Indian 
interests, and Persia as a oountry where both Eng-
land and Russia have important and equal interests. 
The entire oonversation from the Russian point of 
view showed that the questions had been formally 
discussed by the Count and Count Lamsdorff, the 
1 
Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs. 
In a oonversation which the Marquess of Lans-
downe had with Count Benckendorff on November 25, 
1903, the BritiSh pOints of view were presented. 
Russia would be expected to reoognize in the most 
formal manner the status of Afghanistan as absolutely 
within the sphere of British influence. In Thibet, 
Great Britain expected Russia to recognize that it 
was within the British sphere because of its geogra-
phical position. Russia was to abstain from sending 
ag'nts into both Afghanistan and Thibet. Begarding 
the Far East, Great Britain recognized Russia as the 
predominant power in Manchuria, and there.~uld be no 
BritiSh interference with Russian control of her 
Manchurian railway. On the other hand, Great Britain 
1 
G. & T. Vol. IV. pp. 184, 185, 186. 
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expected her trade privileges to be recognized in all 
parts of the Chinese Empire with equal consideration 
I 
and treatment. 
King Edward watched the growing breach between 
Russia and Japan with much anxiety, for Russia openly 
displayed her reluctance to evacuate Manchuria or to 
formally recognize the independence of China and 
Korea~ On New Year's Day, 1904, the King expressed 
his grave anxieties to the Prime Minister respecting 
the situation in the Far East. 
"It looked to him that if France should join 
Russia in the coming conflict, then we should be 
bound to take part with Japan. But if France stood 
out, the King agreed with the Prime Minister, it was 
only in the improbable contigency that Russia would 
crush Japan that any question of England's interven-
2 
tion would arise." 
When Japan's patience w~s exhausted and they were 
convinced ii was impossible to reach a peaceful under-
standing with Russia, the Government severed diplomatic 
relations on February 3, 1904, and five days later the 
Mikado declared war on Russia. There was some propa-
1 
G. & T. Vol. IV. pp. 186, 187, 188. 
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ganda spread in St. Petersburg that Japan had been 
encouraged and backed by Great Britain in taking these 
drastic steps, but the King prepared a message for the 
Tsar which pointed out that England had "maintained a 
scrupulously correct attitude," and that the idea that 
England had instigated Japan or given her direct assis-
1 
tance was an unfounded error. 
As the war became more bitter, relations between 
the King of England and the Tsar of Russia also bec~e 
more strained, for there were many people in England 
who eagerly anticipated a Japanese victory. The King 
remained firm in his desire to supplement the Anglo-
French Entente by an Anglo-Russian understanding, and 
he found a stanch friend in M. Alexander Izvolsky, who, 
as I have said before, made his policy that of better 
2 
relations with Great Britain. On April 14, the King 
took a very definite step towards the promotion of an 
Anglo-Russian rapprochement, when he had his first 
·conversation with M. Izvolsky discussing political 
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'~tre s!1r,' tt adjouta Sa Majestre, ttque moi et mon gou-
vernement, nous ne ~gligerons aucun effort pour 10-
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The negotiations Which were afoot for a better 
Anglo-Russia understanding were further aided by Sir 
Charles Hardinge, the new British Ambassador to st. 
Petersburg. He went to RUssia, the bearer of good 
sentiments from the King, and he assured Count Lams-
dorff of Great Britain's firm intention to maintain 
an attitude of strict neutrality during the progress 
of the war in the Far East, and the earnest desire 
of the British Government to resume, at a more suit-
able ttme, the exchange of views which had been begun 
before the war, with a view of reaching an agreement 
on all questions of issue and dispute between the two 
1 
Governments. On several occasions the tension be-
tween the two was very near the breaking pOint. In 
July, 1904, public opinion in England was gravely ex-
cited by the way in which Russia exercised the right 
of search of neutral vessels for contraband of war. 
Two cruisers of the Russian Volunteer Fleet, the 
Smolensk and Petersburg, had disguised themselves as 
merchant ships and when they passed out of the Black 
Sea, they re~ed their guise as warships in the Red 
Sea, and were arresting British and Ger.man vessels 
on the prinCiple that they were carrying smmunition, 
even though their cargoes were bound for neutral ports. 
1 
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Both countries issued a strong protest to the Russian 
Government. Great Britain resolving to stop, by force, 
if necessary. any Russian prize going through the Dar-
danelles into the Black Sea. Sir Charles Hardinge 
wrote to the King reassuring him of Russia's willing-
1 
ness to meet the British demands. He was always de-
sirous of pursuing ways of conciliation consistent 
with the due assertion of bis country's rights, and 
his natural irritation over Russia's error in press-
ins her claims against contraband interrupted but 
2 
briefly his political advances to Russia." 
Once again the prospect of an Anglo-Russian rap-
prochement was thwarted. this time by an incident which 
looked at one time as though it were going to plunge 
the two countries into open conflict. Mistaking several 
British fishing vessels on the Dogger Bank for Japanese 
vessels, the Russian Baltic Fleet, on the night of Octo-
ber 21, 1904, opened fire on them. Severe damage, loss 
of life and many injuries resulted, but the Russian 
Fleet passed on without rendering any assistance. The 
indignation in England was extremely intense but the 
two governments kept their heads, and the Tsar sent a 
message that since he had no news of the catastrophe, 
1 
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he could only explain the incident as a regrettable 
misunderstanding. He sincerely regretted the loss 
of life and would render adequate compensations to 
the sufferers as Soon as the mystery was solved. It 
was very fortunate that the Russian government did 
not try to escape the consequences of the Admiral's 
error, and the British government showed no intention 
of proceeding to extremities, even though public op-
inion was still in a state of excitement. To the 
ambassadors of both countries go the honours of 
peaceful arbitration, for they exerted every nerve 
to avoid an open rupture. It was agreed between the 
two governments that England should submit its case 
to the H~e Tribunal, and without much difficulty, 
Sir Charles Hardinge was able to arrange satisfactory 
1 
terms of reference • 
1 







The Situation Arising from the Peaoe of Portsmouth 
and the Renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Allianoe 
After the fall of Port Arthur, President Roose-
velt unoffioia11y, but in vain, advised Russia to 
make peaoe. On May 31, after the orowning viotory 
of Tsushima, Japan seoret1y asked the President to 
invite the belligerents to negotiate. On June 8, he 
issued the invitation, offering to arrange the time 
and place. The Peace Mission met at Portsmouth on 
August 10, 1905, and eaoh party submitted its terms 
of peaoe in writing. A deadlock resulted for Russia 
refused to pay an indemnity or to surrender interned 
ships. Finally Japan moderated her terms, and on 
August 29 an agreement was reaohed, and the Treaty of 
Peace was signed at Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on 
September 5, 1905. 
The war with Japan found no favour outside the 
1 
military oiro1es in Russia, and an insurreotionary 
fervour stimulated the people and brought them into 
open oonf1ict with the Tsar's government. He did not 
take advantage of the oonci1iatory advances whioh he 
1 






might have made to his people, and he never recover-
ed the prestige he lost by this lack of foresight. 
Russia's capacities were at a low ebb for a long 
time after Japan's triumphant victory, and it was 
under these circ~tances that several Russian min-
isters abandoned their traditional suspicion of 
England and expreased their willingness to act with 
1 
her in a limited series of circumstances. Francels 
failure to assist Russia in her Far Eastern conflict 
hardly goes to encourage Russia to make another alli-
ance with another western European Power. Yet the 
King of England still clung to the idea that an Eng-
lish understanding with Russia would be the surest 
basis of peace and would remove in the near future 
other sources of suspicion and distrust between the 
two countries. 
One important result of the Russo-Japanese war 
was the revision and restatement of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance of 1902. Though the earlier treaty was con-
cluded for only five years, this new compact of wider 
scope, was Signed in London on August 12, 1905, for 
ten years. The objects of the two Powers, the Pre-
amble declared, were to maintain peace in Eastern 
1 




Asik and India, to preserve the common interests of 
all Powers in China by incurring the independence and 
integrity of the Chinese Empire and,. the principle of 
equal opportunities for the commerce and industry of 
all nations, and to maintain the territorial rights 
and the defence of the special interests of the signa-
tories in Eastern Asia and India. Article II provided 
that, if either party should be involved in war in de-
fence of its territorial right or special interests 
by reason of unprovoked attack or aggressive action, 
wherever arising, the other should came to its assis-
tance. The special interests of the signatories in 
Eastern Asia and India were set forth in Article III 
and IV: "Japan, possessing paramount political, mil-
itary and economic interests in Korea, Great Britain 
recognizes her right to take such measures as she may 
deem necessary provided that they are not contrary to 
the principle of all nations. Great Britain, having 
a speCial interest in all that concerns the security 
of the Indian frontier, Japan recognizes her right 
to take such measures in the proximity of that fron-
tier as she may find necessary for safeguarding her 
Indian possessions." This new Treaty, besides handing 
over Korea to Japan, introduced two principles of vi-
tal importance to Great Britain. In the first place 
,. 
-.------- ---- - ---
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the scope of the agreement was extended to embrace 
India, in this way correcting what was generally re-
garded as the inequality of advantage under the pact 
of 1902. In the second place, each was to come to 
the assistance of the other, if attacked by a single 
Power --- a provision which not only increased Great 
Britain's liabilities, but involved her in the obI i-
gation, under certain circumstances, to intervene in 
.__ 1 
a struggle between her ally and the United S~ates. 
The arrangement was regarded with some concern 
in Russia, but as a whole was not received by the 
press in an unfriendly manner. Sir C. Hardinge sur-
veys the press criticisms thus: "The effect of its 
publication had been to a certain extent discounted 
by the earlier announcements made in the press as to 
its general tenour, from which it was evident that 
the reactionary organs were annoyed at the conclusion 
of the agreement, some of them, such as the "Novoe 
vremja," advocating a counter-combination with Germany 
or America, while the re£erences made in the liberal 
press have been of a generally £riendly character. 
"The 'Russi which receives inspiration from the 
Ministry £or Foreign Affairs and may now be regarded 
1 
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as the organ of that department, holds that the real 
significance of the agreement depends upon the in-
terpretation to be attached to such terms as 'Eastern 
Asia' and 'special interests' mentioned in Article II 
and IV, and the necessi ty is indicated of a compre-
hensive statement of the extent and nature of English 
aims in Asia. If the policy of England is actuated 
by peaceful motives and the maintenance of British 
rights and interests already existing, then no diffi-
culty need be expel'ienced in arriving at an agreement 
between England and Russia. 
"Other liberal organs express the hope that the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance will prove the futility of 
fUrther adv.ntures in the Far East and that Russia 
will henceforth devote her attentions to internal 
reform and the mare pressing problems awaiting sol-
ution in Europe and the Near East. 
"Although the manifestations of ill-humour of 
the German press have been re-echoed in the 'Novoe 
Vremja' and other reactionary journals, it is fully 
realized that a Russo-German understanding in Asia 
as a counterpoise to the Japanese Alliance might 
jeopardise Russian aspirations in the Near East and 





Alliance in Europe." 
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Though that Anglo-Japanese Treaty came rather 
as a shock to the Russian public, it did not retard 
the slow progress of the Anglo-Russian rapprochement. 
Count Witte exerted muCh anti-British feeling in his 
anger at the conclusion of the agreement, and though 
Count Lamsdorff outwardly showed a desire to continue 
negotiations with Great Britain for a better under-
standing, it was felt he had come under the influence 
2 
of Count Witte. The latter realized that if it were 
possible to remove the misunderstandings in regard to 
Persia, Afghanistan, and Thibet, Russian interests 
would be well-served. He made it plain that Russia 
needed peace, but in doing so, she could not afford 
to prejudice existing relations with any other Con-
tinental Power. Count Witte noted that "I feared any 
agreement with Great Britain would arouse the jealousy 
of Germany. As a result, we would perhaps be forced 
into making an agreement with that country too, and 
be cheated in the end. It was owing to my opposition 
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Under the New British Adm1n1stration~ 
December 1905 - May 1906 
It was during this period 'that the incidents 
1 
which I have enumerated above~ transpired, and 
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helped to delay the negotiations of a rapprochement 
between England and Russia --- the change in England 
from a Conservative to a Liberal for.m of government~ 
the French loan to Russia, the suspension of the Duma, 
and C~~bell-Banne~an's rather curt reply. 
It was in the early part of 1906 that Witte made 
his very sudden departure in his Foreign Policy. He 
is said to have told Mr. Dillion, British Journalist~ 
that it was his opinion that the friendship and sym-
pa thY' of England was now of the greatest value to him 
2 
and to Russia. If England were to see her way into 
making some sort of agreement, he would undertake him-
self to arrange tor the settlement of all difficulties 
existing between the two countries~ in the form of a 
satisfactory treaty. Sir Edward Grey was anxious for 
a settlement of all questions at issue when there was 
1 
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a reasonable hope that a solution which would be both 
satisfactory and permanent could be reached. While 
such a situation was being arrived at, he expressed 
the hope that no action would be taken by either 
country which would render a solution of the existing 
"1 
problems more difficult. Count Benckendorff ex-
pressed the personal opinion that if England were to 
agree to a dual arrangement with Rus sia concerning 
the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus, an agreement on 
the other questions with England would be popular in 
Russia, especially if it contained a provision which 
could be published and which would appear to give 
Russia her longed-for commercial outlet to the Per-
"2 
sian Gulf. In January 1906, there was no indica-
tion on the part of the Russian Government as to what 
it was prepared to give in exchange for the favours 
3 
it desired. 
It was expected that relations between the two 
countries would be much improved b7 the institution 
1 
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of the Duma, for the reactionaI7 party in Russia who 
opposed it, had done all in their power to stir up 
1 
popular feeling against Great Britain. 
In May 1906, the Gennan Ambassador, by the or-
der of his Government, said that they would be ver.1 
glad of any arrangement between England and Russia 
as to their reciprocal interests in Turkey, Persia, 
Afghanistan and Thibet, whicl1 did not damage German 
2 
interests. On May 24, Sir Edward Grey was asked 
concerning an alleged agreement arrived at between 
Kis Majesty's Government and Russia. He made the 
following answer: "I cannot make any statement about 
the alleged agreement as described in the Press, be-
cause such an agreement does not exist. But I may 
add that there has been an increasing tendency for 
England and Russia to deal in a .friendly way with 
questions conceming them both as they arise. This 
has on more than one occasion lately led the two 
governments to find themselves in co-operation. It 
is a tendency which we shall be very glad to encour-
age and which, if it continues, will naturally result 
in the progressive settlement of questions in which 
1 
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each country has an interest, and in strengthening 
1 
f'ri endly reI a ti ons between them. n 
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The Period of the Making of the Convention 1906-1907 
The internal situation in Russia grew rapidly 
worse after the suspension of the Duma. It was an 
, 
irretrievable struggle between the revolutionary 
forces and Tsarism. The New Prime Minister soon took 
things in hand, though, and his wise policy appeared 
to appease Russia, for there were indications of a 
period of peace in that country. By this time, di-
plomats in the capitols of both countries had asser-
ted their willingness to assist in the fulfillment of 
the King1s ideal, but much opposition was yet to be 
encountered elsewhere. Distrust of Russian motives 
was still very actively alive in India, and the pro-
posed settlement of disputes and conflicting claims 
in regard to Afghanistan, Persia and Thibet incited 
the suspicions and hostility of BritiSh officials in 
India. 
"It was impossible." as Mr. Morley, then Secre-
tary of State for India, recorded, "for the Indian 
government to be indifferent, and it would have been 
unreasonable to expect that government at once to 
approach it with a friendly mind. Russia had for 
most of a century been the disturber of pea~e in 
~- -----------
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Central Asia, and a menace to the external security 
of our Indian power. There was, therefore, nothing 
to surprise us in the frowns of incredulity, suspi-
cion, and dislike with which the idea of an Anglo-
. 1 
Russian agreement was greeted at Simla." Later, 
though, he very wisely pOinted out that the question 
of an entente was a policy of the home government, 
for there could not be two foreign policies. 
In October, the new Russian Foreign Minister, 
M. Izvolsky, was in Paris, and the King, who consi-
dered him a very close friend, suggested that he be 
invited to London to discuss AnglO-Russian relations. 
Sir Edward Grey said: "We agreed however that this 
would not be desirable yet: it would give rise to 
rumours in excess of the truth; negotiations were 
not ripe for a visit here, and to press him to came 
"2 
would give an impreSSion that we wanted to hustle him. 
In spite of all the difficulties of opposition 
~ delay, negotiations were seriously taken in hand 
in February 1907. On March 6, Campbel1-Banner.man 
wrote the King concerning Grey, who had reported the 
1 
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propitious trend of negotiations with Russia in Per-
sia and other places of dispute. Two weeks later the 
King was delighted to hear from him again that Grey 
was extremely optimistic of an agreement with Russia 
concerning Asiatic affairs, though the question of 
the Dardanelles still remained unsettled •. In that 
same month a Russian squadron was received with en-
thusiasm at Portsmouth. At the King's suggestion, 
the Rus sian officers and crew were given a very cor-
dial welcome. Thus gradually, Grey and Izvolsky, by 
very tactful diplomacy, and backed by their respec-
tive sovereigns, removed every hindrance to an agree-
ment between England. and Russia. 
Sir Charles Hardinge, who kept in constant com-
munication with the King, wrote on August 27, 1907, 
that Izvolsky was hastening negotiations, and that 
the Russian Government had expressed the desire that 
the agreement be signed and ratified by the King of 
England and the Tsar of Russia. Five days later Sir 
Arthur Nicolson and M. Izvolsky signed the draft 
Convention at the Russian Foreign Office, and on Sep-
tember 23, ratifications, properly signed by the King 
and the Tsar, were exchanged, and the Anglo-Russian 
1 
Entente was in being. 
II 
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CHAPTER IV 
THE ANGLO-RUSSIAN AGREEMENT .Q!! CONVENTION ~ 
AUGUST 1907 
On August 7, 1907, Sir Arthur Nicolson and Iz-
vol sky, representatives of Great Britain and Russia 
respectively, signed a convention at Petrograd re-
1 
lating to Persia, Afghanistan and Thibet. Though 
this pact was more limited in sphere than that of 
1904, it accomplished much the same results by re-
moving the causes of antagonisms between the two 
historic rivals. 
The pact began:-
"His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Ireland and of the British Dominions 
beyond the Seas, Emperor of India, and His Majesty the 
Emperor of All the Russians, animated by the sincere 
desire to settle by mutual agreement different ques-
tions concerning the interests of their States on the 
Continent of Asia, have determined to conclude Agree-
ments destined to prevent all cause of misunderstana-
ing between mreat Britain and Russia in regard to 
the questions referred to." 
The first and most important of the three agree-
1 
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ments concerned Persia. "The Governments of Great 
Britain and Russia having mutually engaged to re-
spect the integrity and independence of Persia, and 
sincerely desiring the preservation of order through-
out that country and its peaceful development, as 
well as the permanent establishment of equal advan-
tages for the trade and industry of al~ther nations; 
"Considering that each of them has, for geo-
graphical and economic reasons a special interest in 
the maintenance of peace and order in certain pro-
vinces of Persia adjoining, or in the neighborhood 
of, the Russian frontier on the one hand, and the 
frontiers of Afghanistan ana Baluchistan on the other 
hand; and being desiroUB of avoiding al~ause of 
l 
conflict between their respective interests in all the 
above mentioned provinces of PerSia; 
"Have agreed on the following terms:-
I. Great Britain engages not to seek for 
herself, and not to support in favour of British 
subjects, or in favour of subjects of third 
Powers, any concessions of a political or 
commercial nature --- such as concessions for 
railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, transport, 








Kasr-i-Shirin, passing through Ispanan, Yezd, 
Kakhk, and ending at a point on the Persian 
frontier at the intersection of the Russian 
74 
and Afghan frontiers, and not to oppose, direct-
ly or indirectly, demands for similar conceslons 
in this region which are supported by the Russian 
Government. It is understood that the above-men-
tioned places are included in the region in 
Which Great Britain engages not to seek the 
concessions referred to. 
II. Russia, on her part, engages not to 
seek for herself and not to support, in favour 
of Russian SUbjects, or in favour of the sub-
jects of third Powers, any concessions of a 
political or commercial nature --- such as con-
cessions for railways, banks, telegraphs, roads, 
transport, insurance, etc., --- beyond a line 
going from the Afghan frontier by way of Gazik, 
Birjand, Kerman, and ending at Bunder Abbas, 
and not to oppose, directly or indirectly, de-
mands tor similar concessions in this region 
which are supported by the British Government. 
It is understood that the above-mentioned places 
are included in the region in which Russia en-





III. Russia, on her part, engages not to 
oppose, without previous arrangement with Great 
Britain, the grant of any concessions whatever 
to British subjects in the regions of Persia 
situated between the lines mentioned in Articles 
I and II • 
Great Britain undertakes a similar engage-
ment as regards the grant of concessions to 
Russian subjects in the swne regions of Persia. 
All concessions existing at present in the 
regions indicated in Articles I and II are 
maintained. 
IV. It is understood that revenues of all 
the Persian customs, with the exception of those 
of Farsistan and of the Persian Gulf, revenues 
guaranteeing the amortisation and the interest 
of the loans concluded by the Government of the 
Shah with the "Banque d' Escompte et des Pr'ts 
de Perse, II up to the date of the signature of 
the present Agreement, shall be devoted to the 
same purpose as in the past. 
It is equally understood that the revenues 
of the Persian customs of Farsistan and of the 






on the Persian shore of the Caspian Sea and 
those of the Posts and Telegraphs, Shall be 
devoted. as in the past. to the service of 
the loans concluded by the Government of the 
Shah with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to 
the date of the signature of the present 
Agreement. 
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v. In the event of irregularities occur-
ring in the amortisation or the payment of the 
interest of the Persian loans concluded with 
the "Banque d' Escompte et des prSts de Perse" 
and with the Imperial Bank of Persia up to the 
date of the signature of the present Agreement, 
and in the event of the necessity arising for 
Russia to establish control over the sources of 
revenue guarantee~g the regular service of the 
loans concluded with the first-named bank. and 
situated in the region mentioned in Article II 
of the present Agreement. or for Great Britain 
to establish control over the sources of revenue 
guaranteeing the regular service of the loans 
concluded with the second-named bank. and situated 
, 
in the region mentioned in Article I of the present 
Agreement, the British and Russian Governments 
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undertake to enter beforehand into a friendly 
exchange of ideas with a vi (!Nf to determine, in 
agreement with each other, the measures o~ 
control in question and to avoid all interfer-
ence which would not be in conformity with the 
1 
principles governing the present Agreement.* 
In other words, Peraia was divided into a large 
Russian and a small British sphere of influence, with 
a neutral zone in which the two countries were to have 
equal opportunities. 
The limits of the British sphere of influence in 
Persia as defined in Article II were the results of 
the desire of His Majesty1 s Government to make safe 
their rather strategic position on the frontier of 
India. In 1903 it was pointed out that this was a 
triangle of territory including Seistan, Kerman and 
BUDder Abbas in order to prevent the possibility of 
building a railway by Russia to Bunder Abbas or any 
eastern port. It was agreed that, if the Government 
of India could obtain this and nothing more for the 
sum of 500,00~ to be paid to the Persian Government, 
a good transaction would have been concluded, for it 
might save India from having to make large increases 
in naval contributions and military expenditures in 
the future. 
*1 
lUll text of Treaty. G. & ~. Vol. IV. p. 618. 
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The establianment of a Russian and British sphere 
of influence, is in fact only a self-denying ordinance, 
by means of which each of the Governments pledged them-
selves not to strive for concessions in the other's 
sphere. Other Foreign Powers were at liberty to seek 
concessions allover Persia, and the British trade was 
to be carried on in the Russian sphere as before, the 
sole restriction on the British enterprise being that 
British concessions could not be sought in the Russian 
sphere. 
The limits of the Russian zone were defined by 
the Russian Government, and there were no British 
concessions within those limits which were not safe-
guarded. 
The line of the British zone from Birjand was 
not drawn to the intersection of the Russian and 
Afghan frontiers, because it was realized that such 
a line could have no possible effect on a possible 
Russian movement towards Afghanistan, but care was 
taken, during the negotiations, that none of the 
western frontier of Afghanistan should come within 
1 
the Russian zone. 
In regard to Afghanistan, Great Britain declared 
1 




that she had no intention of changing the political 
status of the country or of interfering in its in-
ternal concerns, and would neither take, nor encour-
age Afghanistan to take any measures threatening 
Russia, so long as the Ameer fulfilled his obliga-
tions. Russia, for her part, recognized Afghanis-
tan as outside her sphere of influence, and promised 
that all her political relations with the country 
should be conduoted through the British Government. 
The complete text concerning Afghanistan is as 
follows:-
"The High Contracting Parties, in order to 
ensure perfeot securit.1 of their respective 
frontiers in Central Asia and to maintain in 
these regions a solid and lasting peace, have 
concluded the following Convention:---
Article I. 
His Britannic Majesty's Government declare 
that they have no intention of changing the 
political status of Afghanistan. 
His Britannic Majesty's Government further 
engage to exercise their influence in Afghanistan 
only in a pacific sense, and they will not them-
selves take, or encourage Afghanistan to take, 







The Russian Go~rnment, on their part, 
declare that they recognize Afghanistan as out-
side the sphere of Russian influence, and they 
engage that all their political relations with 
Afghanistan shall be conducted through the in-
termediary of His Britannic Majesty's Govern-
ment; they f'1.mther engage not to send any 
Agents into Afghanistano 
Article II. 
The Government of His Britannic Majesty 
having declared in the Treaty signed at Kabul 
on the 21 st March, 1905, that they recognized 
the Agreement and the engagements concluded 
with the late Ameer Abdur Rahman, and that they 
have no intention of interfering in the inter-
nal government of Afghan territory, Great Bri-
tain engaged neither to annex nor to occupy in 
contravention of that Treaty any portion of Af-
ghanistan or to interfere in the internal admin-
istration of the country, provided that the 
Ameer fulfills the engagements already con§racted 
by him towards His Britannic Majestyls Government 
under the above-mentioned Treaty. 
Article III. 




designated for the purpose on the frontier or in 
the frontier provinces, may establish relations 
with each other for the settlement of local 
questions of a non-political character. 
Article IV. 
His Britannic Majesty's Government and the 
Russian Government affi~ their adherence to the 
principle of equality of commercial opportunity 
in Afghanistan, and they agree that any facili-
ties which may have been, or shall be hereafter, 
obtained for British and British-Indian trade 
and traders, shall be equally enjoyed by Russian 
trade and traders. Should the progress of trade 
establish the necessity for Commercial Agents, 
the two Governments will agree as to What measures 
shall be taken, due regard, of course, being had 
to the Ameer's sovereign rights. 
Article V. 
The present arrangements will only come into 
force when His Britannic Majesty's Government 
shall have notified to the Russian Government the 
consent of the Ameer to the te~s stipulated above. 
Great Britain obtained for the first time 
from Russia in writing and in the form of a definite 




1. That the Russian Government considered 
Afghanistan as outside the sphere of 
Russian influence. 
2. That all their political relations with 
Afghanistan should be conducted through 
the intermediary of His Majestyts 
Government. 




Commercial agents could not be appointed in Afghan-
istan without previous agreement between the British 
and Russian Governments, and without due regard to 
the Ameer' s sovereign rights. 
The necessity of consent of the Ameer to an 
Agreement relating to Afghanistan was recognized by 
the late Government, since in the proposals which 
were submitted by Lord Lansdowne to the Russian 
ambassador, the following sentence occurred: 
"It wi 11 be necessary that His Majestyt s Govern-
ment should obtain the approval of the Ameer of Af-
ghanistan before any arrangement dealing with this 
2 
question is concluded." 
By these negotiations Afghanistan was no longer 
1 
G. & T. Vol. IV. p. 613. 
2 
G. & T. Vol. IV. p. 614. 
· ~'. 
, 
to be a field for Russian intrigue against Indi~ 
and the English were freed from a burden which had 
worried them for a long t~e. 
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Thibet was the third country to be dealt with in 
the problems of the Middle East Which were settled by 
the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907. Both contract-
ing Powers recognized the territorial integrity of 
Thibet under the suzerainty of China, and agreed not 
to interfere with the countryts internal administra-
tion or attempt to secure special concessions there. 
The land of the Lamas was to remain a barrier be-
tween the Russian bear and the British lion in India. 
The full agreement concerning Thibet is as 
follows: 
"The Governments of Great Britain and Russia 
recognizing the suzerain rights of China in Thibet, 
and considering the fact that Great Britain, by 
reason of her geographical position, has a special 
interest in the maintenance of the status quo in the 
external relations of Thibet, have made the following 
Agreement:-
Article I. 
The two High Contracting Parties engage to 
respect the territorial integrity of Thibet and 





In conformity with the admitted principle 
of the suzerainty of China over Thibet, Great 
Britain and Russia engage not to enter into ne-
gotiations with Thibet except through the in-
ter.mediary of the Chinese Government. This 
engagement does not exclude the direct rela-
tions between British Commercial Agents and 
the Thibetan authorities provided for in Ar-
ticle V of the Convention between Great Britain 
and Thibet of the 7th September, 1904, and con-
firmed by the Convention between Great Britain 
and China on the 27 th April, 1906; nor does 
it modify the engagements entered into by Great 
Britain and China in Article I of the said Con-
vention of 1906. 
-It is clearly understood that Buddhists~ 
subjects of Great Britain or of Russia, may 
enter into direct relations on strictly reli-
gious matters with the Dalai Lama and the other 
representatives of Buddhism in Thibet; the 
Governments of Great Britain and Russia engage, 
so far as they are concerned, not to allow those 











The British and Russian Governments res-
pectively engage not to send Representatives 
to Lhassa. 
Article IV. 
The two High Contracting Parties engage 
neither to seek nor to obtain, whether for 
themselves of their subjects, any Concessions 
for railways, roads, telegraphs, and mines, or 
other rights in Thibet. 
Article V. 
The two Governments agree that no part of 
the revenues of Thibet, whether in kind or in 
cash, sh all be pledged or assigned to Great 
Britain or Russia or to any of their sUbjects. 
Lord Curzon was very insistent in the House 
of Lords that Russia was not a power whiCh could be 
trusted and he seemed very unwilling to grant that 
the arrangement settled the disputes which had such 
long standing between the two nations. By this treaty, 
Anglo-Russian relations were drawn closer together 
than they had been for a century. The obstacles which 
had hindered peaceful co-operation were removed, yet 
the agreement was a bitter pill for the German Foreign 
-1 
Office to swallow. Bismark's policy had always been 
lLee. King Edward VII. Vol. II, p. 572. 
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to maintain friendly relations wi th Russia and not 
to hinder Anglo-Russian antagonisms. It seemed that 
the King was gradually drawing a net around Germany 
which would eventually strangle her. 
As a whole, the Agreement was well received. In 
his letter of September 5, 1907, to Sir Edward Grey, 
Sir E. Goschen, ambassador to Austria, gives a splen-
did example of the general acceptance of the text:-
"The news of the signature of the AnglO-Russian 
Agreement has been favorably recei ved by the Vienna 
Press. Although any criticism of its contents is not 
yet possible, the mere fact that England and UUssia 
have come to an understanding relating, as it is 
generally believed, to the Affairs of Central Asia 
and Persia, is held to be an event of the greatest 
political significance and one calculated to still 
further secure the general peace to whiCh the recent 
meetings of Sovereigns and leading statesmen have 
1 
already so largely contributed ••••• " 
Lord Lansdowne very wisely observed that lasting 
judgment of the Treaty would be impossible until it 
was seen how Russia would conduct herself. Russia 
was in such a position that she needed the goodwill 
1 







~d confidence of Great Britain. Her defeat in the 
Far East was very humiliating, and her only means or 
regaining her fallen prestige was by adding the 
friendship of Great Britain to the French Alliance. 
On the other hand, Great Britain had made definite 
friendly negotiations with France, and she needed 
assurance from Russia to oope with the rapid matura-
tion of Germany. It was through diplomaticco-oper-
ation in various fields that many ~auses of local 
friction were removed. The Anglo-French Entente and 
the Dual Alliance broadened into the Triple Entente, 




















!!!! REVAL }:NTERVIEW, 1908 
The Convention o£ 1907 between England and 
Russia and the Reval visits were parts of the same 
policy, and the latter was necessar,J in order to 
1 
cement the new friendship. For some time before 
the visit, the press of both Paris and St. Paters-
burg had circulated rumours that a new Triple 
Alliance was in preparation between England, France, 
and Russia. Because of the propaganda which was be-
ing spread in this manner, on May 27, Sir E. Grey 
stated in the House of Commons that the King's visit 
to Russia was on the same lines of those visits which 
he had made to other sovereigns, and that there was 
no intention of contracting any new treaty with 
2 
Russia. 
The proposed visit was warmly welcomed in Russia 
by the Tsar and his followers, and the Liberals as 
well. The Tsar is quoted as saying: "I am confident 
that this meeting will strengthen the numerous and 
1 
G. & T. Vol. V. p. 236. 
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powerful ties whiCh unite our Houses, and will have 
a happy result of bringing our oountries oloser to-
gether, and of maintaining the peace of the world. 
During the past year several questions of great im-
portance for Russia and Great Britain have been 
settled satisfactorily. I am certain that Your 
Majesty appreciates as much as myself the value of 
these agreements, for, despite their limited scope, 
they can only aid in spreading between our countries 
the sentiments of goodwill and mutual confidence." 
"I can cordially subscribe to the words of Your 
Majesty on the Convention recently concluded," re-
plied the King. "I believe it will serve to strength-
en the ties Which unite our peoples, and I am certain 
it will lead to a satisfactory settlement of some im-
portant matters in the future. I am convinced that 
it will also greatly aid to maintain the peace of 
1 
the world." 
On June 5, 1908, King Edward, Queen Alexandra 
and the Princess Victoria, sailed from Port Victoria 
2 
to pay the long expected visit to the Tsar. The 
journey to Kiel was very rough, but the canal was 
1 
Quoted. W. & G. Vol. II. pp. 398,399; Lee. 
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reached on June 7, and there the British royal party 
was met by Prince and Princess Henry of Prussia. The 
King landed at the entrance to the canal to inspect 
the masses of troops which were assembled and the 
guard of honour. After a short stay, their Majes-
ties left again for Reval and were escorted by a 
division of German destroyers for some distance from 
the harbour • 
"The smart appearance of the whole of the German 
North Sea Fleet lying in anchor in the port, gave 
food for reflection upon the recent German naval pro-
gram of construction, while the intricate evolutions 
of the torpedo flotilla, which excited the admiration 
of all the Naval officers on board the Royal Yacht 
served as a useful object lesson of the efficiency 
, 1 
of the German navy." 
The King and Queen arrived off Reval on Tuesday 
morning, June 9. The weather was delightful and the 
Tsar, the Imperial family, and the Queen of the 
Hellenes met their royal guests on board the two 
Imperial yachts and the cruiser "Almaz," the sole 
survivor of the large Russian fleet that took part 
in the battle of Tsushima. 
1 
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During the course of the vi si t the King had 
several interviews with M. Stolypine, the Tsar's 
chief Minister. "a grave, splendid-looking man 
with a long beard," and M. Izvolsky, from which 
92 
the best possible impressions were created on both 
sides. Hardinge, for his part, had several oppor-
tunities of discussing with M. Izvolsky the various 
questions of foreign policy in which the two coun-
tries were particularly interested. Of the inter-
view, he himself says: "I cannot help thinking that 
this direct exchange of views between the two For-
eign Offices will be beneficial and facilitate the 
1 
solution of most of our pending questions." 
The question of Macedonian reform entailed a 
considerable amount of discussion, and gave M. Izvol-
sky an opportunity of expounding the general policy 
of Russia towards England and Germany. He explained 
to Hardinge that in Germany there was much fervor as 
to the future political developments amongst the 
Powers. He felt it was imperative that Russia should 
act with the greatest of pradence towards Germany, so 
tha t the 1 atter country would have no caus e to com-
plain that the rapidly growing amity between'England 
1 




and Russia had caused a corresponding deterioration 
of the relations of Russia towards Germany. Izvolsky 
pointed out that the visit of the French President to 
London, of the King to Reval, and the impending 
visit of the President to Russia had not tended to 
improve the attitude of the already critical Germany, 
and he feared trouble fram Germany over the adoption 
of the scheme of Macedonian reforms. He hoped that 
the Kingts visit to Reval might be consecrated by the 
announcement of the complete agreement of England and 
Russia upon the scheme of reforms to be adopted in 
Macedonia. They cmme to an agreement about the re-
forms to be conceded by TUrkey to Macedonia, which 
was a ceaseless peril to the peace of Europe, for it 
was seething more and more with tyranny and revolt, 
brigandage and outrage. 
More than once the Emperor expressed his great 
satisfaction at the visit of the King and Queen, which, 
he said, sealed and confirmed the intention and spirit 
of the Anglo-Russian Agreement. He expressed the con-
viction that the friendly sentiments which prevailed 
Between England and Russia could only mature and in-
crease in strength with the progress of time to the 
mutual advantage of both countries. He realized that 




matters, but the parallelism of the national interests 
of England and Russia in Europe and Asia would far 
outweigh any possible results from such trivial 
differences of opinion. 
The King in conversation with the Tsar touched 
upon f~ily affairs only; political matters were not 
mentioned. Hardinge says: "It is not for me to 
touch upon the private aspect of the effect of the 
King 1 s visit upon the Emperor, and the manifest 
pleasure shown by the Emperor and the Empress at the 
meeting again after so long an interval of trial and 
misfortune to some of their relations to whom they 
are most attached, but some of the members of the 
Emperor's suite commented upon the marked difference 
in the Emperor's spirits and attitude during the 
King's visit to Reyal compared to what they were at 
the Emperor's recent visit to SWinemfinde, where he 
felt anxiety all the time as to what might be unex-
1 
pectedly sprung upon him." 
On the second day of the visit, while the King 
was on board the Imperial yacht "Standart," His Ma-
jesty appointed the Emperor as Admiral of the British 
Fleet. The honour was quite unexpected and greatly 
1 





pleased the Emperor. At the official banquet that 
evening on board the royal yacht, the King proposed 
the Emperor's health, and the latter was saluted by 
the British cruisers. To those who recalled the over-
bearing, and self-confidence of the large Russian 
Fleet whiCh sailed for Japan in 1904, and of which the 
sole surviving ship lay at anchor at Reval beside the 
Emperor's yacht, it was a pathetic and perhaps ironic 
incident when the Emperor arose and paid the King a 
counter-compliment by asking His Majesty to do him 
the honour of becoming an admiral "of our young and 
growing fleet." As the King warmly accepted the 
honour, the guns of the Emperor's yacht saluted the 
1 
new Russian Admiral of the Fleet. 
Such was a fitting ending to a satisfactory and 
successful visit whose crowning achievement had been 
the changing of an atmosphere of Russian suspicion 
and distrust towards England to one of cordial trust. 
One result for which the Reval visit was held 
to have been a chief contributor was the establishment 
in October 1908 of the Russo-English Chamber of 
Commerce at st. Petersburg, which was joined by the 
influential members of the Duma and the Council of 
the Empire. Thus it was hoped that the recently 
i 




declining Anglo-Russian trade would grow. It was 
widely felt that the Reval Interview helped to force 
growth of the German idea of King Edward's "encirole-
ment policy." The Kaiser harboured an entirely in-
oorreot opinion of the King in thinking that the 
latter was "really an ogre who sought with inoredible 
astuteness and suooess to build a ring of steel 
1 
around Germanyl" In reality King Edward was utterly 
for peaoe, and those who saw in his round of visits 
to the sovereigns of many European countries signs 
of hemming in of Germany, most conveniently forgot 
that during the entire length of his reign, he had 
more meetings with the Kaiser than with any other 
-2 
crowned head in Europe. 
The many various efforts to better the Turkish 
Government in Macedonia were very futile and tire-
some. The British protests against Turkish misrule 
decreased her influence and was adverse to British 
oommeroial interests there. A prevalent humanitarian 
feeling in England and perSisting sympathy for the 
Christians who were under TUrkish dominion was ex-
tremely strong, and British political and oommercial 
1 





interests were overborne by it. 
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As each of the other Powers was vitally inter-
ested in Macedonian Reforms, it was necessary to deal 
with all measur~ in a concert of powers. The cardi-
nal point of Russian and Austrian Foreign Policy was 
prestige in the Balkans, and each watched the move-
ments of the other with keen distrust, less one should 
gain a slight advantage over the other. Germany was 
selfishly thinking of her own political and commer-
cial influence and expansion in Turkey, neither of 
which she would risk for philanthropic reasons. France 
had just escaped from her difficulties in Morocco, she 
was rather dubious of more to come, and she wished to 
avoid trouble elsewhere. She, too, had her commercial 
interests and refused to lead a Crusade against the 
Sultan. 
It is futile to give an account of the task 
which the Powers undertook in trying to improve or 
2 
mitigate Turkish rule in Macedonia. The Concerted 
negotiations had progressed to such a point that in 
the middle of June, King Edwardls Government was in 
such a position to submit a draft note to the Russian 
1 
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Government which was accepted in principle, and 
which was also accorded a satisfactory reception by 
, 
the other Powers. However, before negotiations 
reached their final stage, the revolution of the 
Young Turks broke out in Turkey. Fear of the "Reva1 
programme" of reforms had hastened the preparations, 
and on July 3, 1908, the standard of revolt again st 
the Sultan was raised in Macedonia with astounding 
success. When it was apparent that the new regime 
was fi~ly established, the British and Russian 
Governments dropped the matter. 
The Macedonian Reforms as they had progressed 
and developed under Russian and British negotiations, 
though they were not successful in their ultimate aim, 
were significant as an indication of a reconciliation 
of English and Russian po11cies in the Balkans, and 
were a supplement to the Convention of 1907. 
CHAPTER VI 





NA~ QE ~ TRIPLE ENTENTE AND ITS SIGNIFICANCE 
On June 29, 1891, the fact that the Triple Alli-
ance had been renewed was made public and Franco-
Russian suspicion was intensified. It was the gener-
al opinion in both countries that England was adher-
ing to the Triple Alliance in order to thwart the 
ambitions of Russia in the Straits. To the Russians 
it was annoying, because they wished to open up the 
Dardanelles, and to the Franch because they had not 
completed the development of their colonial policy 
1 
in Western Africa. 
The renewal of the Triple Alliance, backed by 
sympathy from Great Britain, for which no attempt was 
made for concealment, made it very obvious that is 
Russia wished to break her isolation, it was necessary 
that she find a partner in France. On July 23, a 
French fleet entered Russian waters for the first time 
aince the Crimean War. A new chapter in European hla-
tory was begun when a warmer reception was given the 
French at Cronstadt than was usual for official greet-
ings. Before this time, in absolutist Russia, the 
playing of the Marseillaise had been strictly ~or­
bidden, both in public places and in private homes. 





During the French visit the prohibition was" relaxed, 
but was re-imposed after their departure, and the 
news was heralded abroad that "the Autocrat of all 
the Russians had stood bareheaded while the banas 
played the marching song of the Sans-culottes of 
1 
1793." 
In France the"Cronstadt demonstration was re-
ceived with much enthusiasm, and it created a very 
deep impression throughout Europe. The French Go-
vernment hastened to propose an alliance stipulating 
that the two governments should agree to consult with 
one another in case of any danger, and they were to 
mobilize simultaneously as soon as anyone of the 
Triple Powers should mobilize. Giers was rather 
skeptical of the designs for recovering Alsace-
Lorraine, and it was his desire to make the agreement 
vague and applicable in Africa and the Far East. 
While France constantly feared a renewed attack from 
Germany, Russia, on the o~her hand, felt no great 
hostility towards Germany, as her traditional enemy 
was England. France did not want Russia to have ab-
solute control of the Dardanelles and Constantinople, 
and in the controversies of North Africa, she did not 
need Russian support to any extent because it was 
1 










oomparatively easy to make oompromise agreements with 
England and Russia. 
Beoause of such a wide divergenoe of interests, 
it was some time before the French Government was 
able to give the Entente a more stable and binding 
form. It was felt that the Entente should be supple-
mented by a Military Convention which was to provide 
that in case of a sudden German aggression, the whole 
forces of France and Russia should mobilize imme-
diately and work to secure mutual advantage. General 
Miribel drew up a draft whiCh met Russian desires with 
a few modifications. It was signed by the Chief of 
Staff of both countries and approved by the Tsar on 
August 17, 1892. As yet, it could not be considered 
as having binding force, for it had not been signed 
by the Ambassador or Foreign Minister of either 
country. 
A further delay of a year and a half was caused 
by the desire of the Tsar that absolute secrecy should 
be preserved, and that the document should be known 
only to the President and Prime Minister of France. 
In direct opposition to this was the fact that the 
French Constitution did not permit the President of 








On January 4, l894~ the Tsar gave his approval 
to an exchange of official diplomatic notes which 
made binding the Military Convention of August 17, 
l892~ and it became the basis of the very secret 
Franco-Russian Alliance. Though no one doubted that 
an alliance had been concluded, the momentus secret 
was not officially revealed to the world until Jan-
uary~ 1895. As neither the exchange of notes nor 
the Military Convention, which was signed only by 
the Military Officials of both countries, was a 
formal treaty, neither had to be submitted to the 
French Parlimnent for ratification. The text of the 
Military Convention was never made public until it 
was published in a French Yellow Book in 1918. 
The conclusion of the Dual Alliance was an 
event of great significance not only for the two coun-
tries directly concerned, but also for Europe. It 
was universally recognized that France had recovered 
from her catastrophic defeat when a first-class Power 
should seek an Alliance with her. In France, because 
of the secrecy of the agreement, there was a hope 
that it might contain some assurance in regard to the 
recovery of the lost Rhine provinces. Russia was 
coveting plans for expansion in the Far East, and the 
proposed Siberian Railway would require the unlimited 
capital whiCh France was always eager to supply at a 
104 
moderate rate. From the viewpoint of European poli-
tics, the conclusion of the alliance was a sign that 
the reign of Bismark had come to an end. The Triple 
Alliance was stronger than its new rival and its posi-
tion was not altered so long as Great Britain's sym-
pathy could be counted on. The diplomatic situation 
would be transformed and the balance of power would 
be tilted when Great Britain should Change her support 
from the older to the younger group. 
The death of Queen Victoria in 1901, and the re-
tirement of Lord Salisbury in 1902, opened the way for 
two men who were more enthusiastic than their prede-
cessors for closer relations with France --- Edward 
VII and Lord Lansdowne. As Prince of Wales, the new 
King had spent much of his time in Paris or on the 
Riviera. In the spring of 1903, on his own initiative, 
he paid to Paris his first formal visit as King, and 
was delighted by his reception. Lord Lansdowne and 
M. Delcass~ were the Secretaries of Foreign Affairs 
in London and Paris respectively. 
Egypt, for more than a quarter of a century, had 
been the perpetual source of friction between Downing 
1 
Street and the Quai d'Orsay. Objection to British 
1 









occupation of Egypt had for a long time been the 
cardinal point of French Foreign Policy. An agree-
ment acceptable to France would be hard to obtain, 
and yet it was absolutely necessary for Great Britain 
to have Fr~nch support for her position to be satie-
1 
factory. It was a great relief to England when She 
recei ved the assurance that tithe Goverrunent of the 
French Republic, for their part declare they will not 
obstruct the action of Great Britain in Egypt by ask-
ing that a limit of time be fixed for the British 
occupation or in any other manner, and that they give 
their assent to the draft Khedival Decree, containing 
the guarantees considered necessary for the protection 
of the interests of the Egyptian bondholders, on the 
condition that, after its promulgation, it cannot be 
modified in any way without the consent or. the Powers 
2 
Signatory of the Convention of London of 1885." 
Morocco, on the other hand, was pregnant with 
trouble for France, and it soon became a diplomatic 
nightmare for all Europe. Spain had a number of 
settlements on the north coast of Africa, but she did 
not wish to acquire any of the inner territory of 
Morocco. Spain wished only the assurance of retaining 
1 
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her Mediterranean coast line and a few sea ports on 
the Atlantic coast opposite the Canary Islands, if 
Morocco were to be partitioned. The French felt that 
the destiny of their great colony of Algeria, as well 
as the aspirations for a great North African Colonial 
Empire, made it important that French control be ex-
tended over Morocco, either by police supervision, by 
a protectorate, or by direct annexation. After the 
French had taken Tunis from under her grasp, Italy 
was without colonies and looked towards Morocco. In 
1900, France bought the claims of, Italy by a direct 
promise not to interfere with Italian aspirations in 
Tripoli. England wished to prevent any European Power 
from establishing a coaling station on the Atlantic 
coast of Morocco; if she could not acquire Tangier for 
herself, she was determined not to let it fall into 
the hands of any other Great Power; and lastly, she 
did not intend to loose the control of the entrance 
to the Mediterranean, which Gibraltar for two centuries 
had assured her, by the Pillar of Ceuta falling into 
the hands of any other strong European Power. The 
rapidly increasing commercial interests in Morocco 
were Germany's chief cause for wishing to preserve 
1 
her status there, and some Germans wished to es-
1 






tablish a German Colony in western Morocco. This 
was opposed by the Kaiser for fear of antagonising 
England and France. 
In the agreement between England and France in 
1904, which referred to Egypt and Morocco, were in-
volved Spain and Germany, and to a lesser degree, 
other powers. In view of the important French con-
cessions in Egypt, England recognized the special 
interests of France in Morocco. The Government of 
Great Britain promised not to hinder Franch action 
in Morocco, with a view of maintaining order and 
assisting the Sultan in making effective reformes in 
his government. Great Britain was to maintain her 
treaty rights under the Convention of 1856, and 
French and British commerce was to enjoy absolute 
equality for a period of thirty years. France guar-
anteed that she would not annex any territory or 
erect fortifications near the Straits of Gibraltar, 
and that she would prevent any other power from doing 
so. The principle of commercial liberty was recog-
nized by both countries in Egypt and Morocco, and free 
passage through the Suez Canal and the Straits of Gi-
braltar was assured. 






1904, England promised France merely diplomatic 
support, but this was soon supplemented by momentous 
but very secret naval and military arrangements, or 
1 
as Sir Edward Grey calls them, "conversations," 
which cmme to be a most vital link in the system of 
Secret Alliances. Public opinion demanded some sort 
of understanding between England and France, something 
more substantial than mere diplomatic support. Lord 
Lansdowne and M. Cambon entered into discussions for 
an exchange of notes, and they seemed to have advanced 
'" until the notes had been presented to M. Delcasse for 
2 
his final approval. The latter interpreted them as 
an assurance of a British alliance and armed support, 
on the strength of which he was prepared to risk a 
war with Germany, and they became the basis of his 
arguments while trying to persuade the French Cabinet 
and President to refuse the German demands in the 
Morocco crisis. .; M. Delcasse resigned when President 
Loubet and the Rouvier Cabinet declined to take the 
;3 
risk of war. 
Sir Edward Grey points out very definitely that 
the naval and military conversations which began in 
L 
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1905 under Lord Lansdowne, were not to commit either 
Government, and involved no promise in support of 
1 
war. M. Delcass~ was so ardent in his desire for a 
promise of military or naval support if Germany 
forced war upon France, that he tended to greatly 
exaggerate the nature of Lord Lansdowne's offer. This 
is a very dangerous example of either conscious or un-
conscious interpretations when a country desires. some-
thing more than mere diplomatic support. 
On December 11, 1905, Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman 
formed a Cabinet, in which Sir Edward Grey replaced 
Lord Lansdowne at the Foreign Office. One of the first 
tasks which claimed his attention was to quiet the fears 
'2 
of the French. He could only state his own personal 
opinion that if the French were attacked by Germany in 
consequence of a question arising out of the Morocco 
Agreement, public opinion in England would be moved 
3 
strongly in favour of France. Grey further pointed 
out to M. Cambon that both England and France might 
be involved in war if a formal Alliance were formed 
as a result of the extension of British diplomatic 
support. He assured M. Cambon, when the latter was 
s'lmllllarizing Grey's personal opinions, that: "Much 
1 
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would depend as to the manner in which the war broke 
out between Germany and France. I did not think 
people in England would be prepared to fight in order 
to put France in possession of Morocco. They would 
say that France should wait for opportunities and be 
content to take time, and that it was unreasonable 
to hurry matters to the point of war. But if, on 
the other hand, it appeared that the war was forced 
upon France by Germany to break up the Anglo-French 
"Entente," public opinion would undoubtedly be very 
strong on the side of France. At the same time, M. 
Cambon must remem ber that England at the present 
moment would be most reluctant to find herself en-
gaged in a great war, and I hesitated to express a 
decided opinion as to whether the strong feeling of 
the Press and of public opinion on the side of France 
would be strong enough to overcome the great reluc-
tance which existed amongst us now to find ourselves 
involved in war. I asked M. Cambon, however, to bear 
in mind that, if the French Government desired it, it 
would be possible at any time to re-open the conver-
sation. Events might Change, but, as things were at 






the question of a defensive alliance." 
III 
This long and critical interview between Sir 
Edward Grey and M. Cambon is significant for sever-
al reasons. In the first place, the very strong 
sympathy which Grey held for France, his very evi-
dent desire to render the diplomatic support, as far 
as possible, and at the same time his reticence in 
making any formal engagement, either written or 
verbal, which might bind England to war, is all 
very evident. In the second place, the official 
military and naval conversations between the Bri-
tish and French Staffs, was approved and confirmed 
by Sir Edward. In the third place, neither Greyfs 
statement to Cambon, nor his approval of the naval 
and mili tary conversations, was made with the know-
ledge and sanction of the cabinet. It was not until 
1912 that circumstances caused the military and naval 
"conversations" to be revealed to the whole Cabinet, 
and not until Greyfs speech of August 3, 1914, that 
Parliament and the British public had any inkling of 
2 
them. In Greyfs own words: "It has been necessary 
to divide on this conversation at length, because it 
1 
Grey. Vol. I. pp. 78-79. 
2 






defines the position that was maintained up to the 
very outbreak of the war. From time to time, the 
same question was raised, but never did we go a 
hairs-breadth beyond the position taken in the con-
1 
versation with M. Cambon on January 31, 1906." 
The Anglo-Russian Agreement of 1907, when it 
is regarded asa complement of the Anglo-French En-
Tente, forms the final phase of the diplomatic re-
volution which was gradually taking place in Europe. 
The three Powers, Great Britain, France and Russia 
were thus united in an entente which was less solid 
than an absolute alliance, but whiCh exerted equally 
as much power, and which was of equal diplomatic 
value. At the beginning of King Edward's reign, 
there had existed between Great Britain and-France, 
and Great Britain and Russia, sufficient acute points 
of difference to have caused half a dozen wars. In 
1907 each of these conflicting antagonisms had been 
reconciled, and friendship had taken the place of 
suspicion and di strust. "The King lost no opportu-
nity at any time of furthering the most cordial re-
lations between his own country and the rest of 
2 
Europe. His aim was peace and cordial co-operation." 
1 
Grey. Vol. I. p. 79. 
2 






Thus the removal of local friction between England 
and Russia was followed, as had been the case with 
France, by diplomatic co-operation in various fields. 
The Entente Cordiale and the Dual Alliance developed 
into the Triple Entente, which confronted the Triple 
1 
Alliance on the European chess-board. The Alliance 
between Great Britain and Japan virtually made Japan 
a fourth member of the Entente, and gave her a posi-
2 
tion which no Oriental state had ever attained. 
Between the years of 1907 and 1914, there was an 
increasing strengthening of the bonds of opposition 
between the two distinct groups in which six great 
powers of Europe had gradually divided themselves. 
It has been well said that it was the Anglo-Russian 
. . 
Convention of 1907 which marks, politically, the era 
which ended in the peace treaties of Versailles, St. 
3 
Germain, Sevres and where not. During the first 
four years the development was retarded; but beginning 
with the French occupation of Fez, (spring of 1911), 
the German threat at Agadir, the Italian seizure of 
1-
W. & G. Vol. III. p. 366. 
2 
See above, p. 23 • 
3 





Tripoli, Anglo-German naval rivalry, the failure 
of the Haldane Mission, and the Balkan Wars, it 
'I 
proceeded more rapidly. 
114 
Bismark had made it the cardinal point of his 
foreign policy that Germany should always be on good 
terms with Russia and that the Anglo-Russian anta-
gonisms should be fostered. After a generation of 
such fixed ideas, the Gonvention between Russia and 
Great Britain was rather a bitter pill for the 
Foreign Office of Germany to swallow, though the 
German press received the news of the Convention 
with apparent indifference as in no way affecting 
2 
German interests • 
The crystallization of opposition between the 
Triple Alliance and the Triple Entente was accentuated 
3 
by four tendencies. Each of the systems of alliances 
tended to change from an alliance of "peace and amity" 
to one of defensive character. Just as Germany felt 
it her duty to back her ally if the latter became in-
volved in a war with Russia, so France felt it her 
1 
Ibid.' Introduction to Book Three. The Entente 
and Germany, pp. 459-473 gives a comprehensive and 
~ntlc summary of period 1907-1914. 
2 
Lee. Vol. II. p. 572. 
3 






obligation to back Russia. While France was trying 
to strengthen the prestige of the Triple Entente, 
Germany tried to tighten up the Triple Alliance. 
The sharp conflicts between Austria and Italy tended 
to widen the bonds of the Alliance, while England, 
France and Russia were able to make closer negotia-
tions for both military and naval co-operation be-
cause of their proximity of interests. Even though 
the bonds of both camps were tightened up and 
strengthened, there still remained within the En-
tente and the Alliance, more occasions of distrust 
and suspicion than is ordinarily supposed. Within 
each group, ther efore, special efforts were made 
to increase the harmony and security and to lessen 
the friction and suspicion. This was accomplished 
by bartering and mutual concessions to the selfish 
aims of the fellow-members. Within both groups of 
the six important Powers of Europe there was a 
rapid increase of military and naval armaments. In 
the opposite camp there resulted an ever-increasing 
tendency for suspiCion, fear and hatred for the 
opposite camp. This led to greater armaments, and 
...... 
thus, to that vicious circle of steadily increasing 
war preparations, mutual fears and common suspicion 
which was ultimately to engulf, the world in that 
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